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Contract Design, Default Rules, and
Delaware Corporate Law
Jeffrey Manns* & Robert Anderson**
Abstract
Incomplete contract theory recognizes that contracts
cannot be comprehensive and that state law necessarily has to
fill in gaps when conflicts arise. The more complex the
transaction, the more that lawyers face practical constraints that
force them to limit the scope of drafting and broadly rely on legal
defaults and open-ended terms to plug holes and address
contingencies. In theory Delaware law serves as lawyers’
preferred jurisdiction and forum for merger and acquisition
(M&A) transactions and other high-end corporate deals because
of the state’s superior default rules for corporate law and its
judiciary’s expertise in discerning the “hypothetical bargain” of
the parties.
This paper sets out to examine whether lawyers’ professed
confidence in Delaware defaults actually shows up in the
drafting of merger and acquisition agreements. Lawyers may
base deals in Delaware law because of their familiarity with its
provisions, or Delaware’s appeal may reflect the substantive
adding of value in filling contractual gaps. Our premise is that
the best proxy for examining lawyers’ reliance on a jurisdiction’s
defaults is the extent of brevity in legal drafting, which is closely
related to reliance on standards rather than rules. Incomplete
contract theory predicts that reliance on defaults should broadly
* Professor, George Washington University Law School
** Professor, Pepperdine Caruso University School of Law. We would
like to thank participants in the annual Conference on Empirical Legal
Studies and the University of Toronto’s annual Law & Economics conference
for their constructive comments and suggestions.

1197

1198

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1197 (2020)

translate into implicit (and explicit) references to existing
defaults that conserve time and space in drafting, especially
through the use of parsimonious standards rather than prolix
rules. To the extent to which comparable contracts grounded in
different jurisdictions have systematic differences in length, this
finding would serve as evidence that lawyers are placing greater
reliance on the defaults of one jurisdiction compared to another.
In this paper we compare the length of public company
merger and acquisition (M&A) agreements between Delaware
transactions and those governed by the law of other jurisdictions.
To the extent practitioners regard Delaware law as more
comprehensive, more precise, or more settled (due to the
Delaware General Corporation law, case law, or the judicial
system) compared to other jurisdictions, then we would expect
that Delaware M&A agreements would be more concise because
of greater reliance on defaults and open-ended terms.
We found agreements governed by Delaware law are no
shorter, and in fact are generally longer than agreements
governed by the law of other states even when we accounted for a
spectrum of control variables including the deal structure, the
quality of law firms, deal complexity, and the size of the
transaction. This finding held true even when we identified and
controlled for the textual source of the precedent documents. Our
results challenge the conventional wisdom about contracting
parties’ placing greater reliance on Delaware law.
Our findings suggest that a gap exists between the Delaware
legal system’s outsized reputation and the actual practice of
lawyers in drafting M&A agreements who appear to place no
more reliance on the defaults of Delaware law than on the
defaults of other jurisdictions. This finding calls into question
why Delaware’s statutory and judicial defaults do not appear to
matter in the contracting context in which the Delaware
difference compared to other states should be the most apparent.
Lawyers’ confidence in Delaware may be genuine when it comes
to steering incorporations and M&A litigation to Delaware. But
if lawyers rely on the defaults of Delaware contract law no more
(and perhaps less) in contract drafting than that of other
jurisdictions, then it suggests that Delaware’s reputation for
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corporate law exceeds its substance. We conclude that the text is
likely influenced far more by fortuitous events in the drafting
process, such as the precedent chosen, than by the default rules
of the jurisdiction.
Table of Contents
I.

Introduction ..................................................................... 1200

II.

Drafting in a World of Incomplete Contracts ................. 1207
A. The Incomplete Nature of Contracts........................ 1207
B. The Tradeoff Between Precision and Defaults ........ 1214

III.

Calibrating Legal Terms to Default Rules ..................... 1216
A. Background ............................................................... 1216
B. Empirical Strategy .................................................... 1217

IV.

Data and Methods ........................................................... 1222
A The Data .................................................................... 1222
B. Two Approaches to Analyzing Delaware’s Defaults 1227

V.

Analysis and Results ....................................................... 1228
A. Regression Analysis of Document Length ............... 1228
B. Classification of Agreements Based on Textual
Content ...................................................................... 1244

VI.

Discussion ........................................................................ 1253
A. The Results and Their Interpretation...................... 1253
B. Objections .................................................................. 1262
1. The “Equivalence” Objection ............................... 1262
2. The “Confounding Variables” Objection ............. 1263
3. The “All the Important Terms Are Included in Every
Deal” Objection .................................................... 1265

VII.

Conclusion ........................................................................ 1267

1200

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1197 (2020)

I.

Introduction

Every contract is necessarily incomplete. 1 Contracting
parties have neither the interest, the time, nor the ability to
anticipate and address every contingency. Lawyers must
therefore rely extensively on statutory and judicial defaults and
open-ended terms, such as “commercially reasonable efforts” or
“consent not to be unreasonably withheld.” 2 Contracting parties
invest time in negotiating deal-specific terms, but must weigh
the costs and value of contracting around defaults that raise
interpretive ambiguities or that the parties perceive to be
undesirable. 3 The result is that incomplete contract theory
predicts a spectrum approach to contracting. The greater the
1. Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in a
Complete Contract World, 33 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 725 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 732–33
(1992) (examining how transaction costs and market power shape contracting
parties’ incentives to contract around default rules); Robert E. Scott, The Law
and Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 279, 280– 81
(2006) (discussing how the law and economic theory of incomplete contracts
has developed analytic tools to address the problems posed in the contracting
process).
3. See, e.g., Baker & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 733–34 (discussing the
role of statutory and judiciary defaults in “completing” incomplete contracts
by filling gaps in contracts or refusing to fill contractual gaps); Richard
Craswell, The Incomplete Contracts Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 151, 156–57 (2006) (discussing how “the literature
on incomplete contracts might just as accurately be referred to as the
literature on ‘incomplete courts’” because it recognizes that “the efficiency of
key decisions cannot be evaluated perfectly by courts”); OLIVER HART, FIRMS,
CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 37–38 n.15 (1995) (arguing that
problems related to vague provisions should push parties to craft alternative
provisions that have greater clarity or are more easily verifiable); Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
261, 289–98 (1985) (arguing that default rules should be chosen to provide
terms that would minimize contracting parties’ cumulative transaction costs);
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713,
765–67 (1997) (discussing how reliance on defaults enhances contractual
drafting efficiency and increases network benefits for contracting parties).
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confidence parties have in the defaults of a jurisdiction (and
judicial interpretation of those defaults), the more concise
contracts will be as parties broadly rely on default rules and
open-ended terms to minimize the costs of transactional
drafting and other costs associated with detailed rules. 4
This paper leverages this insight to examine empirically
whether Delaware’s reputation for comprehensive, precise, and
settled corporate law shapes the actions of lawyers when they
are drafting merger and acquisition agreements. Delaware has
long served as the destination of choice for incorporations and
as the most appealing forum for the adjudication of business and
finance litigation, such as mergers and acquisition litigation. 5
Most commentators have attributed Delaware’s appeal to its
ostensibly superior legal system. 6 “Race to the top” advocates
believe Delaware has won a competition among the states in
producing a statutory framework and specialized Court of
Chancery that enhance shareholder value. 7 In contrast, “race to
4. See, e.g., Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness
in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848,
881–95 (2010) (discussing the efficiency enhancing effects from contractual
vagueness in the material adverse change clause context); Richard A. Posner,
The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581,
1582–83 (2005) (“[C]ontracts are likely to be shorter the more competent the
judges are because lawyers will not have to spell out everything for a dim
interpreter.”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 594–607 (2003) (providing an
overview of the role of defaults in shaping contractual drafting under
incomplete contract theory).
5. Approximately 60 percent of publicly traded companies in the United
States are incorporated in Delaware including 63 percent of the Fortune 500
companies. See DEL. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF CORPS., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, 1
(2010), https://perma.cc/XW3Y-B7UY (PDF). Over 90 percent of
publicly-traded companies that are incorporated in a state outside of their
principal base of operations are incorporated in Delaware. See Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. &
ECON. 383, 391, 420 (2003) (“The choice is thus not among a multitude of
competitors for the national market but rather between incorporating in the
home state or in Delaware.”).
6. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 306–07 (2d ed.
1977) (arguing that Delaware’s appetite for tax revenues from corporate
charters incentivized it to develop efficient corporate law rules); RALPH K.
WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 28–42 (1978) (developing the
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the bottom” advocates argue that Delaware statutes and case
law merely excel at adding managerial value and entrenching
managers at the expense of shareholders. 8 But both advocates
“race to the top” argument in greater detail); Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N.
Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON.
179, 184–90 (1985) (arguing that companies “will select their state of
incorporation adaptively” leading to a “race to the top” among states); Robert
Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525,
527– 31 (2001) (analyzing the Tobin’s Q of Delaware corporations versus
non-Delaware corporations to argue that incorporation in Delaware adds
value); Daniel R. Fischel, The ‘Race to the Bottom’ Revisited: Reflections on
Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporate Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913,
919–20 (1982) (pointing to the greater market valuation of Delaware versus
non-Delaware firms in arguing that Delaware “has achieved its prominent
position because its permissive corporation law maximizes, rather than
minimizes, shareholders’ welfare”); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 265–73 (1985)
(arguing that the positive market reaction to reincorporations in Delaware
suggests that state competition results in a “race to the top”); Guhan
Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32,
35– 38 (2004) (applying the Tobin’s Q approach to show that Delaware law
adds a modest, though declining amount of value compared to other states);
Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 289–92 (1977) (arguing that state
competition results in a “race to the top”); Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith,
What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax Law, 27 REV. FIN. STUD.
3593, 3616–17 (2014) (finding there is a premium for Delaware incorporation
based on a comparison of the Tobin’s Q of Delaware and Nevada corporations).
8. See, e.g., Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558–59 (1933) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (framing the competition among states for incorporation
revenues as a race “not of diligence but of laxity”); RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN
& JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 54–61 (1976) (framing
Delaware’s preeminence as a product of catering to management rather than
shareholders); Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza & Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The
Market for Corporate Law, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 134,
137–41 (2006) (developing a formal model that suggests that Delaware law
systematically favors managers over shareholders in contexts where their
interests conflict); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1437, 1440–45 (1992) (arguing that “state competition produces a race for the
top with respect to some corporate issues but a race for the bottom with respect
to others” in which managers’ interests conflict with shareholders); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State
Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1820–21 (2002)
(providing empirical evidence that state competition results in corporate
governance rules that benefit managers but potentially at the expense of
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and critics of Delaware have a common theme: Delaware’s legal
system stands out from other states which creates incentives to
rely on Delaware law. Therefore, we would expect that lawyers
would place greater confidence in the defaults established by
Delaware statutes, case law, and the Court of Chancery to
further either shareholder or managerial value, which should be
apparent in the drafting of contracts.
In this paper, we subject this ostensible confidence in
Delaware to empirical scrutiny to assess whether the actual
drafting of merger agreements appears to reflect greater
reliance on the statutory and judicial defaults under Delaware
law compared to that of other states. In an earlier work, The
Delaware Delusion, we showed empirically that both the “race
to the top” and “race to the bottom” schools of thought may rest
on a flawed premise because the decision to incorporate in
Delaware does not appear to affect how financial markets value
publicly traded companies. 9 We leveraged the fact that every
merger of companies in different states constitutes an
“acquisition reincorporation” because the target corporation’s
assets are redeployed from the target corporation’s regime of
corporate law into the surviving corporation’s regime of

shareholders); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 633, 665–66 (1974) (sparking the debate on the
efficiency of Delaware law by arguing Delaware was leading a “race for the
bottom”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An
Essay for Bill Cary, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 187, 209–11 (1983) (arguing for the
need to reexamine corporate law to remedy rules that favor managers at the
expense of shareholders); Richard W. Jennings, Federalization of Corporation
Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 BUS. LAW. 991, 993–94 (1976) (arguing
Delaware favors managerial over shareholder interests); Stanley A. Kaplan,
Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 BUS. LAW.
883, 885–87 (1976) (framing Delaware as leading a “race of leniency” towards
management); Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45
OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 555–57 (1984) (arguing states compete in a “race to the
bottom” because corporate law systematically favors management over
shareholder interests and that reforms are unlikely because managers will
“flee” to other states); Gordon G. Young, Federal Corporate Law, Federalism,
and the Federal Courts, 41 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 146, 151 (1977) (arguing
Delaware’s appeal lies in its leadership of the “race to the bottom”).
9. See Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware Delusion, 93
N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1077–85 (2015) (presenting the results of our empirical
study).
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corporate law. 10 By comparing the reaction of capital markets to
mergers that reincorporated companies into and out of
Delaware, we were able to show that the financial world places
no apparent value on the alleged superiority of the Delaware
legal system. 11
Our previous work left an important issue unresolved:
whether lawyers themselves perceive value associated with
Delaware law and courts. This question is particularly
important because lawyers choose Delaware as the locus of
jurisdiction and chosen forum for a larger percentage of merger
and acquisition agreements. 12 But that fact in itself does not
reveal the extent of reliance on Delaware defaults (as it could be
explained by path dependence, familiarity with Delaware law,
or other non-substantive factors). 13 In this article we analyze
the confidence, or lack thereof, that lawyers appear to place in
Delaware law in drafting merger and acquisition agreements.
Our premise is that the best proxy for reliance on defaults and
open-ended terms is brevity in legal drafting. Contracts will
vary in length due to deal-specific differences, but incomplete
contract theory predicts that reliance on defaults should
translate into implicit (and explicit) references to existing
defaults that conserve time and space in drafting. To the extent
to which comparable contracts grounded in different
jurisdictions have statistically significant differences in length,
this finding would serve as evidence that lawyers are placing
greater reliance on the defaults of one jurisdiction compared to
another.
Merger and acquisition (M&A) agreements offer an
appealing setting to test empirically the extent of lawyers’
reliance on Delaware defaults compared to those of other
jurisdictions. M&A agreements combine a high degree of
time-sensitive negotiation with extensive reliance on statutory

10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 1067–68.
Id. at 1080–86.
See infra Tables 2A–2C.
See infra Part VI.A.
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and judicial defaults. 14 M&A agreements are generally based on
precedents from earlier deals to lower the costs of contracting,
which in theory incentivizes lawyers to rely on preexisting
open-ended terms from the earlier agreements and legal
defaults. 15 The fact that M&A agreements are generally drafted
under tight time constraints also means that the parties and
their lawyers must weigh carefully the degree of time and
resources to invest in negotiating and crafting terms that
deviate from defaults (as well as the risks from failing to do
so). 16 The comparable substance and time frames for public
company M&A agreements means that it is easier to make
apples to apples comparisons to assess the extent of reliance on
defaults.
We compare the length of public company merger and
acquisition (M&A) agreements between Delaware transactions
and those governed by the law of other jurisdictions. Our
premise is that if other jurisdictions pose greater uncertainties
(compared to Delaware) then we would expect lawyers in
comparable non-Delaware agreements to invest more effort in
delineating more specific, rule-oriented provisions and in
contracting around undesirable defaults. Those specific,
rule-oriented provisions would require additional words, which
translate into greater length of agreements.
Our results show that agreements governed by Delaware
law are no shorter, and are in fact systematically longer than
agreements governed by the law of other states even when we
14. See Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Engineering Greater
Efficiency in Mergers and Acquisitions, 72 BUS. LAW. 657, 690 (2017) (detailing
the reasons M&A agreements are time-sensitive).
15. See Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Boiling Down Boilerplate in
M&A Agreements: A Response to Choi, Gulati, & Scott, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE
219, 229 (2019) (explaining how M&A agreements are made); see also STEPHEN
J. CHOI, ET AL., INNOVATION VERSUS ENCRUSTATION: AGENCY COSTS IN
CONTRACT REPRODUCTION 45 (July 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/FKN5-QRRV
(PDF) (discussing how lawyers in private equity M&A deals engage in higher
levels of innovation in drafting compared to corporate and sovereign bond
contracts, yet also carry over more obsolete and encrusted terms from previous
deals).
16. See Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution of
Merger Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 66 (2017) (describing the
benefits of beginning contract drafting with defaults).
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accounted for a spectrum of control variables including the deal
structure, the quality of law firms, deal complexity, and the size
of the transaction. This finding held true even when we
identified and excluded the Delaware (and other states’)
jurisdiction-specific language. In fact, the most predictive
variable for the length of an agreement turned out to be the
length of the precedent agreement from which counsel copied
the original draft. This fact suggests that lawyers place little
reliance on the statutory and judicial defaults and that
Delaware law matters little as an “off-the-rack” default to
economize on the costs of drafting.
Our findings suggest that there is a gap between lawyers’
professed and actual confidence in Delaware law and courts. 17
Lawyers may simply give lip service to the reputation of
Delaware law and its judiciary, but in the context of M&A
contract design, lawyers appear to pay less attention to the
statutory and judicial defaults than they would to the defaults
of any other jurisdiction. 18 These results have important
implications for both Delaware corporate law and for contract
design, where the tradeoff between ex ante drafting costs and ex
post enforcement costs is paramount. 19
Our finding that lawyers rely on the defaults of Delaware
no more (and possibly less) than those of other jurisdictions also
suggests that Delaware is living off its past reputation and that
the Delaware legislature and courts may need to address the
comprehensiveness and precision of Delaware contract law to
maintain Delaware’s reputation in the long run.
Part II of our paper explains the incomplete nature of
contracting and its application to M&A drafting. Part III applies
this incomplete contracting framework to our empirical strategy
in the M&A context. Part IV describes the dataset we created to
test the “Delaware default” hypothesis. Part V presents our
17. See, e.g., William J. Carney, George B. Shepherd, & Joanna
Shepherd, Lawyers, Ignorance, and the Dominance of Delaware Corporate
Law, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 123, 134–42 (pointing to survey data to argue that
lawyers’ confidence in and reliance on Delaware corporate law is based both
on Delaware’s reputation and lawyers’ ignorance of the alternative corporate
law frameworks offered by other states).
18. See infra Part VI.
19. See infra Part VI.
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results. Part VI explains the potential implications of our
findings.
II.

Drafting in a World of Incomplete Contracts
A.

The Incomplete Nature of Contracts

Explaining the nature and incentive effects of “incomplete
contracts” has been a longstanding theme of contracts
scholarship. 20 Contracts consist of an interplay of statutory and
judicially crafted mandates, default rules, and tailored
provisions. 21 The scope and nature of statutory provisions may
evolve over time due to legislative changes or exogenous shocks
of judicial interpretations of contract-related statutes. 22 But in
any given drafting context the working assumption is that
lawyers are able to anticipate with a high degree of certainty
the likely constraints on the parties imposed by statutory
mandates because they are grounded in settled law. 23 Similarly,
existing judicially created mandates can also be anticipated and
addressed by the parties, such as the common law requirement

20. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 732–33 (examining how
transaction costs and market power shape contracting parties’ incentives to
contract around default rules); Craswell, supra note 3, at 1052–61 (providing
an overview of the economic literature on incomplete contracts); Scott, supra
note 2, at 280–81 (discussing how the law and economic theory of incomplete
contracts has developed analytic tools to address the problems posed in the
contracting process).
21. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87–89 (1989)
(describing the legal rules of contracts).
22. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and
Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 553 (1990) (comparing changes in
duty of loyalty and duty of care).
23. See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1093–94 (1972) (discussing the similar notion of immutable entitlements that
exist outside of contract law); Stewart J. Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on
Contract Presumptions, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 329 (1988) (explaining the
differences between inalienable and immutable rules).
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of consideration for contracts, which parties can deviate from
only under narrow circumstances. 24
Academics have debated the extent to which statutory or
judicially crafted mandates live up to goals of protecting parties
to the contract or parties outside of the contract. 25 But it is clear
that the bedrock of statutory and judicially crafted mandates
provide a starting point for crafting a contract. At the same time
legislators leave mandatory provisions for contracts
intentionally incomplete. 26 Mandatory provisions provide broad
rules to the contract negotiating and enforcement process
through establishing principles such as the duty of good faith, 27
rather than the core substance of the contract itself. 28 This is
especially true in corporate law, in which mandatory rules are
scarce and default rules are much of the substance of the law. 29
For this reason most of the debate on incomplete contracts
centers on the nature and scope of state-created default rules
and the degree of leeway given to the contracting parties. 30 Both
24. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-203 (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977)
(recognizing an exception from the common-law requirement for consideration
in cases in which written agreements under seal serve as a substitute for
consideration).
25. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Kyle D. Logue, Mandatory Rules and Default
Rules in Insurance Contracts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
INSURANCE LAW 377, 382–83 (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015)
(discussing how justifications for mandatory rules are frequently based on
claims of market failure); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 20–32 (1991) (discussing the
objectives underpinning statutory mandates for contractual issues related to
corporate law).
26. See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 931, 938–44 (2003) (explaining why legislatures choose to leave
“incomplete” laws).
27. See U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-209 cmt. 2, 2-305(2), 2-306(1), 2-311(1) (1977).
28. See Sarah Howard Jenkins, Contracting Out of Article 2: Minimizing
the Obligation of Performance and Liability for Breach, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
401, 403 n.10 (2006) (listing the U.C.C.’s mandatory provisions).
29. See generally Black, supra note 22 (arguing corporate law rules that
appear mandatory are often trivial or avoidable).
30. See generally Anthony Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 351, 370–71 (1978) (arguing that contractual efficiency is furthered by
allowing parties to contract around legal rules); Jonathan Macey & Fred
McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA.
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the nature of the default rules and the scope for customization
form bases for states to differentiate themselves in the “market
for contracts.” 31
Statute-based defaults that contracting parties can opt out
of are generally easy to identify through their express language.
For example, numerous default rules of corporate law are
clearly identified through language such as “unless otherwise

L. REV. 701, 736–37 (1987) (advocating for statutes to allow parties to contract
around legal rules when cheaper alternatives are available); Barry E. Adler,
The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999);
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2; Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence:
Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992); David
Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991); Richard Craswell, Contract Law,
Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989);
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of
the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle:
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and
the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990);
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial
Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).
31. See, e.g., John C. Coates, Managing Disputes Through Contract:
Evidence from M&A, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 295, 322–23 (2012) (discussing
factors that influence choice of law and choice of forum); Theodore Eisenberg
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study
of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’
Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1481–85 (2009) [hereinafter Eisenberg &
Miller, Flight to New York] (analyzing New York’s efforts to appeal to
corporations); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Ex Ante Choices of
Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements,
59 VAND. L. REV. 1973, 1979–83 (2006) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Ex
Ante Choices of Law and Forum] (discussing how New York and Delaware are
the two states most frequently chosen for both choice of law and choice of
forum); Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of
Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1101–03 (2009) (arguing
sophisticated parties “prefer a regime that strictly enforces formal contract
terms absent an express invitation for judicial intervention”); Sarath Sanga,
Choice of Law: An Empirical Analysis, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 894,
902– 03 (2014) (analyzing choice of law clauses using a machine-coding
algorithm). But see Kyle Chen et al., Empirical Study Redux on Choice of Law
and Forum in M&A: The Data and Its Limits, 16 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 4 (2015)
(questioning studies that found that Delaware corporations choose contracts
subject to New York law).
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provided in the certificate of incorporation.” 32 Frequently, states
incorporate the standards and default rules for contracts by
embracing the Uniform Commercial Code and contracts
restatements. 33 Judicially created default rules may be more
difficult to identify and navigate. 34 Some judicial decisions have
created default rules that have broad applicability and form the
common law of contract. 35 But other judicially created default
rules have evolved over time in a more patchwork way in
response to omissions in contracts. 36 The nature of the case by
case construction of default rules inherently creates a degree of
uncertainty in terms of the breadth and applicability of default
rules. 37
Although mandatory rules are often unavoidable, the
applicability of both statutory and judicially created default
rules are a product of both the choice of contracting parties and
cost constraints in negotiations. 38 The contracting parties rely
heavily on defaults and case law because they lack either the
economic incentives or the ability to anticipate and address all
future contingencies. 39 In practice this fact means that default
rules established by state law and judicial precedents must

32. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223 (2020).
33. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of Contract
and the Default Rule Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1525 (2016) (discussing the
role of the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in crafting default rules and standards
for Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the contracts restatements).
34. See id. at 1530–31 (discussing how common law default rules
develop).
35. Id. at 1525–26.
36. See id. at 1537 (explaining the judicial gap-filling role in contract
interpretation).
37. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2253 (2002) (stating judicial default rules and judicial
error can “undermine planning”).
38.
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 608 n.144 (discussing the costs
of avoiding an unappealing default rule).
39. See id. at 544–45 (framing the problem as the inability of the parties
to achieve the goals of efficient reliance and efficient trade, i.e. to ensure that
their agreement will maximize the expected surplus minus reliance costs).

CONTRACT DESIGN

1211

necessarily serve to fill gaps in contracts. 40 The debate over
incomplete contracts has multiple dimensions in explaining why
contracts are incomplete, but the common thread is the
centrality of statutes and courts to address the inherent
shortcomings of contractual drafting.
Two primary stumbling blocks hinder the ability of
contracting parties to anticipate and address contingencies that
may affect their contracts. 41 The first issue is the practical
problem of ex ante transaction costs. 42 One only needs to look at
the Management Discussion & Analysis section of public
company 10-Ks to see how it is possible to identify a sweeping
range of potential risks affecting companies. 43 But the
transaction costs of anticipating the range of potential risks to
a contract, as well as calculating and agreeing upon how to
resolve each contingency in an efficient way, may far outweigh
any potential benefits for the parties. 44
Parties may not be able to anticipate some risks at all, such
as the absence of liquidity in the depths of the 2008 financial
crisis or the exogenous economic shock caused by the COVID-19
pandemic, which may make it challenging for a contract to cover
all contingencies. 45 The larger problem is the issue of
low-probability contingencies, which could be recognized and
addressed, but only at a cost that cannot be justified by the
40. See id. at 545 (“Parties trade efficiently when, and only when, the
value of the exchanged performance to the buyer exceeds the cost of
performance to the seller. Parties invest efficiently when their actions
maximize a deal’s expected surplus.”).
41. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 33, at 1530 n.19
(distinguishing between “front end” costs and “back end costs”); Robert E.
Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract
Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 196–97 (2005) (proposing parties balance
front end and back end costs to achieve “the efficient optimum”).
42. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 33, at 1530 n.19 (defining the “front
end” or ex ante costs of “negotiating and drafting a contract term”).
43. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2019) (detailing instructions for filling out
this section of 10-Ks).
44. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 33, at 1558–59 (analyzing
contracting costs).
45. See Richard Squire, Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 885 (2014) (explaining the importance of illiquidity in
the 2008 financial crisis).
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expected value of the offsetting benefits to the parties. 46 These
ex ante transaction costs make the incomplete nature of
contracts virtually inevitable and necessitate at least partial
reliance on state defaults. 47 Parties may also strategically
decide not to resolve potential contingencies for fear that
disagreement about how to address them could signal negative
information or otherwise stymie the deal, which leaves their
future resolution in the hands of courts. 48 When faced with
contractual omissions that turn out to be relevant, courts are
left with the task of gap filling by trying to identify the ex ante
intentions of the contracting parties based on extrapolation
from the issues the parties did address. 49 This process entails
uncertainty even though courts attempt to view the parties’
likely intentions in an objective way with an eye towards how
future parties would respond to a judicially created default
rule. 50
The second, related issue is the ex post enforcement costs. 51
Contingencies may occur that are not addressed in the contract,
but the parties may be concerned that the costs of litigating the
issue may outweigh the benefits of enforcing the contract. 52 If
the parties do proceed with litigation, the judicial process for
interpreting contracts inherently entails a degree of uncertainty
both in terms of the interpretation of facts and application of
46. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 759 (“Even if a party knows
that a particular contingency is possible, the contingency may be considered
so unlikely that it would not pay to become informed about the rule of law.”).
47. See id. (explaining various situations in which contingencies may not
be addressed).
48. See id. at 731–33 (discussing how parties negotiate contracting costs).
49. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 33, at 1546–47.
50. See id. (proposing common law courts’ default rules demonstrate “how
courts conceive their role in resolving contract disputes”).
51. See Posner, supra note 4, at 1582–84 (discussing the need to analyze
both the ex ante and ex post transaction costs to the completion of contracts).
52. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After
Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 857 (2003) (discussing
the challenges courts may face in verifying the underlying facts behind a
contract and related reliance which may undercut incentives to invest in
contract design); see also Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts:
An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 271, 277 (1992) (discussing the various types of transaction and
litigation costs that motivate contracting parties’ decisions).
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law. 53 It is possible that courts may not be positioned to identify
some facts that underpin contractual provisions if they are
contested by the contracting parties, yet courts may be able to
identify other facts and terms with complete precision. 54 The
challenge is that judicial verification of facts will likely lie
somewhere in between because of conflicts between the parties
over the underlying facts. 55 Additionally, the judicial
application of the law creates its own set of uncertainties. While
some contractual terms may be based on settled law, 56 the
process of interpreting ambiguous contractual provisions and
related statutory provisions necessarily entails a degree of
uncertainty. 57
This fact underscores the appeal of choosing a state law and
forum with a large body of case law, high-quality statutes, and
judges with the credibility and expertise to handle the
uncertainties that contractual litigation entails. 58 Arbitration,
settlements, or renegotiations may allow parties to minimize

53. See generally Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating
Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006) (discussing how
parties design contracts in light of litigation risks).
54. See, e.g., id. at 817–18 (discussing the tension between verifiable and
non-verifiable provisions).
55. See, e.g., id. at 818 (explaining the parties’ ability to “regulate the
enforcement process”).
56. The scope of what constitutes settled law in contract may be far
narrower than most lawyers appear to believe. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Mitu
G. Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial
Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 2–4 (2017) (discussing how boilerplate terms may
lose their meaning over time in the context of the pari passu clause, a
boilerplate provision in sovereign debt contracts); see also Anderson & Manns,
supra note 15, at 221–23 (discussing how the text of boilerplate terms in M&A
transactions rapidly evolve in unintended ways which potentially undercuts
the terms’ meaning); Christopher C. French, Understanding Insurance
Policies as Noncontracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing
These Unique Financial Instruments, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 535, 537 (2017)
(discussing the difficulties of determining the intent of drafters of standard
form language in insurance contracts).
57. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 53 at, 831–32 (explicating the
variables in litigating contracts).
58. See infra Part VI.A.
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the costs and uncertainties of the legal process. 59 But the
judicial process matters in these contexts too as arbitrations,
settlements, and renegotiations would take place in the shadow
of the expected judicial outcomes. 60
B.

The Tradeoff Between Precision and Defaults

The challenge parties face is that the tradeoff between ex
ante transaction costs in drafting contracts and ex post
enforcement costs is a spectrum question. No party can
realistically draft contracts that address every possible
contingency and contract away from all undesirable defaults,
nor would parties want to because of the time, the costs, and the
potential uncertainties created by deviating from defaults. 61
While parties may rely almost exclusively on default contractual
agreements in basic standardized contracts (aside from the
financial terms), complex contracts, such as merger agreements,
necessarily entail some negotiated departures from defaults
that may be mutually beneficial for the parties. 62 For this reason
contracting parties rely at least in part on a combination of
defaults and open-ended terms that place faith in the courts to
resolve disputes. 63 We see that empirically as virtually any
contract embraces state defaults and includes intentionally
open-ended terms to capture a range of conduct and vest courts
with a degree of ex post discretion in resolving conflicts. 64
This fact raises the question of how parties decide how to
strike this balance. Part of the calculation is a weighing of the
costs and benefits of investing time in negotiating and drafting

59. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 53, at 856–57 (“It is now common for
parties to agree to have disputes resolved by arbitration rather than by
litigation or by the court of a specified venue.”).
60. See, e.g., W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use
and Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1096 (2012) (discussing how
employment and class arbitrator decisions cite judicial precedents to signal
that judicial precedent shape arbitration awards).
61. See supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 20–31 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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precise provisions, rather than relying on defaults. 65 But
another part of the equation is the degree of (implicit) confidence
that lawyers place in a given jurisdiction. 66 The more parties are
concerned about the limitations of a judiciary’s ability to verify
the underlying intentions or uncertainty costs in judges’
application of the law, the more we would expect to see contracts
substituting precise terms for contractual defaults and
minimizing the extent of open-ended contractual terms such as
“commercial reasonableness” or “best efforts.” 67 For example,
parties can negotiate their way out of default rules in contracts
to minimize the costs of enforcement, such as by requiring
arbitration in the event of contractual disputes. 68 But the more
parties have confidence in the clarity of statutory defaults or the
ability of courts to resolve disputes in a cost-effective and
accurate way, the more we would expect them to reduce the
up-front costs of contracting by relying on contractual defaults
or opting for vague, rather than precise terms. 69
It would be difficult to upend all defaults and avoid all
open-ended contractual terms entirely because of the extent to
which they reduce ex ante transaction costs. 70 But the law and
economics literature would suggest that the more comfortable
parties are with their choice of law and the related judicial
backstop, the more they can minimize ex ante transaction costs
65. See supra notes 41–57 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., HART, supra note 3, at 37–38 n.15 (arguing that problems
related to vague provisions should push parties to rely on alternative
provisions that have greater clarity or are more easily verifiable).
68. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of
Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL
STUD. 549, 550–51, 554–55 (2003) (arguing that contracting parties may prefer
vague provisions if they anticipate addressing potential disputes through an
arbitration process).
69. See, e.g., Scott & Triantis, supra note 53, at 818 (“A reduction in
back-end enforcement costs should lead the parties to substitute more
back-end for front-end investment by replacing precise provisions with vague
terms.”).
70. See id. (“[S]ome of the rules governing litigation are default rules that
the parties can vary or manipulate in their ex ante contract. By doing so, the
parties can further reduce the cost of litigation and improve the ex ante
incentive gains from enforcement.”).
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by relying on defaults and open-ended contractual terms. 71
Thus, the existing literature suggests a testable comparative
static: as the quality of default rules and courts increase, the
number and complexity of terms in the negotiated contract
should decrease. 72 This point is a central premise of our paper
as we are focusing on the question of whether firms relying on
Delaware contract law (in the form of acquisition agreements)
rather than the law of another state are more likely to act on
that premise in relying on the defaults.
III. Calibrating Legal Terms to Default Rules
A.

Background

This article focuses on the degree to which M&A lawyers
rely on defaults in drafting acquisition agreements under
Delaware law compared to those under the law of other states.
One way of assessing the substantive appeal of Delaware to
M&A lawyers would be to analyze the degree of movement
towards or “flight” of merger agreements away from Delaware
choice of law and choice of forum clauses. 73 This approach would
be straightforward as in theory the more confidence lawyers
have in Delaware the less likely they will be to end reliance on
Delaware law and to stipulate that any disputes be adjudicated
in another jurisdiction. 74 The shortcoming of this approach is
that the choice of law and choice of forum provisions may be tied
to many other factors that have little to do with lawyers’
confidence in Delaware or lack thereof. 75

71. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
73. See Eisenberg & Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum, supra
note 31, at 2001–09 (using data to document the “flight” of merger agreements
away from Delaware choice of law and forum).
74. Cf. id. at 1988 (“If Delaware’s efficient and skilled judges and
procedures are part of the positive attraction of Delaware as a place of
incorporation, as some claim, one expects Delaware to attract choice of law
clauses disproportionately relative to other states.”).
75. See id. at 1994–95 (discussing the effect of various “variables—choice
of law, state of incorporation, business locale, and attorney location—on law
and forum choices”).
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Instead, our premise is that a better way to understand how
much lawyers value the default rules and judicial expertise
under a state’s law would be to analyze the extent to which they
(1) embrace the default rules of the state’s statutory framework
and (2) defer to judicial interpretation of contractual terms
based on the state’s forum. Lawyers crafting transaction
agreements governed by state law with fewer undesirable
defaults require less contracting around those defaults. 76
Lawyers drafting transaction agreements with forum selection
clauses that place interpretation of contractual provisions in the
hands of an expert judiciary (especially one without juries as in
the Delaware Chancery Court) can rely on more open-ended,
flexible standards rather than on detailed, rule-based
provisions. 77
This article analyzes the extent to which M&A lawyers
calibrate their contractual terms to the default rules of the law
and forum selected. Both Delaware and other states are likely
to have strengths and weaknesses in their default rules, leading
the lawyers to draft different provisions calibrated to the law of
each state. 78 To the extent that there are systematic differences
between states, we argue that they may reveal differences that
lawyers perceive in default rules from state to state. If the
substantive terms in M&A agreements do not appear to differ
based on the legal regime governing the contract, then lawyers
may perceive all states as having equal default rules (or equally
disregarded default rules that they contract around), which
would suggest that lawyers’ functional confidence in Delaware
is no stronger than what they place in other jurisdictions.
B.

Empirical Strategy

We are studying the extent of lawyers’ reliance on state
default rules using the prism of merger agreements for the
acquisition of public companies. We chose to analyze merger
76. See supra Part II.B.
77. See supra Part II.B.
78. See generally Michael P. Dooley & Michael D. Goldman, Some
Comparisons Between the Model Business Corporation Act and the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 737 (2001) (comparing corporate law
from several states with Delaware’s default rules).
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agreements because they are highly negotiated agreements that
do not follow standardized forms, 79 which means lawyers are
constantly confronted with the choice of relying on defaults or
opting out by drafting precise terms. 80 We chose public company
merger agreements rather than private company agreements
because public transactions provide access to richer set of
control variables (e.g., transaction size and structure) than do
private agreements. 81 Additionally, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission rules mandate the disclosure of all public
company merger agreements, while the only private company
merger agreements that the public is privy to typically involve
acquisitions of or by public companies which cover only a portion
of private company M&A activity. 82
We analyze two closely related hypotheses in this paper.
The first is that to the extent default rules differ among states,
the terms used in merger agreements should differ because the
79. Although academics and practitioners often describe public company
M&A agreements as standardized, to the extent that is true it is as to the
substance of provision categories, and not their form. Public company M&A
agreements vary highly in terms of their form even when the initial draft
comes from the same law firm. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 16, at 61
(“[P]ublic merger agreement terms are not based off a common ‘form’
agreement, but rather are the product of an ‘evolution’ over many generations.
This is true even within large law firms where drafts are based on prior
agreements rather than standardized form language.”).
80. Public company merger agreements are among the most visible and
high-profile documents in all of transactional legal practice, and therefore
reflect the investment of considerable legal time and attention. See Using
EDGAR to Research Investments, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://perma.cc
/HZ2G-5BUG (last updated Sept. 5, 2018) (noting that certain mergers and
acquisitions must be disclosed when at least one of the companies is subject to
SEC disclosure rules); see also Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business
Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243 (1984)
(observing that corporate acquisition agreements are “among the highest
forms of the business lawyer’s craft”).
81. See generally Vojislav Maksimovic et al., Private and Public Merger
Waves, 68 J. FIN. 2177 (2013) (discussing the various factors that influence the
acquisition behaviors of public and private firms).
82. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure rules provide
access to over twelve thousand merger agreements from 1994 to 2014,
providing a broad set of data to study. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 8-K
4– 5, https://perma.cc/NPB4-P3NB (PDF) (requiring companies to disclose
material definitive agreements outside of the ordinary course of business
including merger agreements).
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choice of law varies from state to state. The second is that to the
extent that lawyers believe courts in different states are more
or less sophisticated in addressing business law issues, the
terms used in merger agreements should differ because the
implications of forum selection vary from state to state because
of the differences in the experience and quality of state
judiciaries. 83 In the majority of merger agreements, however,
the forum chosen is the same as the state law chosen, so we have
only a limited ability to distinguish between the two concepts. 84
Therefore, although we present results for both variables, we
focus primarily on the choice of law, which is less susceptible to
selection bias as we discuss below. 85
The law and economics literature on contracts generally
predicts that better default rules and more expert courts will
lead to shorter and more open-ended contracts. 86 Drafting
contracts is costly, and the cost increases with the number of
terms in the agreement. 87 Covering more contingencies results
in more terms, meaning that the more complete the contract the
more costly it is to draft. 88 At some point, the cost of addressing

83. The focus of this Article is on the implications of the choice of forum
in drafting when choosing between the specialized business court in
Delaware—the Court of Chancery—and the non-specialized court systems of
most other states. Future research could look at the equally intriguing
implications of choice of forum on drafting in considering other differences
between state judiciaries, such as elected versus appointed judiciaries. See,
e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 729–48 (1995) (discussing the potential
distorting effects of elections for judges in many states on judicial
decision-making).
84. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York, supra note 31, at
1505 (“Contracts overwhelmingly specify the place of choice of law as the
choice of forum.”); Eisenberg & Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum,
supra note 31, at 1981 (“If a particular state’s law is chosen, that state’s forum
is also very likely to be selected.”); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in
the American Courts in 2015: Twenty-Ninth Annual Survey, 64 AM. J. COMP.
L. 221, 239 (2016) (observing that choice of law clauses and forum selection
clauses “almost always” select the same jurisdiction).
85. See infra Part V.
86. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
87. See supra Part II.B.
88. See supra Part II.B.
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farfetched contingencies is no longer worth the benefit,
preventing contracts from being completely contingent. 89
There are many law and economics accounts of costly
contract drafting, and almost all of them predict longer, more
detailed contracts will result from undesirable default rules or
less competent courts. 90 To make our analysis more concrete,
however, we take as our basic starting point the specific model
developed by Steven Shavell on contractual completeness. 91
Shavell models the parties’ choice among (1) specific terms, (2)
general terms, and (3) gaps in writing a contract. 92 Specific
terms express the parties’ intended outcome in individual
contingencies, and therefore are certain to produce the desired
result, but are costly to write. 93 General terms express the
parties’ intent as to a group of contingencies, and are less costly
to write but may result in incorrect interpretation. 94 Gaps in
contracts are contingencies not addressed in the contract at all,
and are cheapest, yet represent a conscious or unconscious
decision to leave interpretation of these issues to the court. 95
[The model is based on the basic idea that] the more closely
the courts’ interpreted contracts resemble the parties’ true
wishes, the more willing the parties are to leave gaps and
write fairly general terms, whereas the parties are more
willing to take extra pains to write more detailed contracts
when courts refrain from interpreting terms or interpret
terms in ways that run counter to their true desires. 96

Because the cost of writing specific terms is higher than
gaps or general terms, parties will write more specific terms to
89. The notion that contracts were not completely contingent because of
the cost of writing contracts has existed in economics literature for many
decades. However, the more recent literature explicitly modeling the cost of
contract drafting has developed more recently. See, e.g., Ronald A. Dye,
Optimal Length of Labor Contracts, 26 INT’L ECON. REV. 251, 251–52 (1985)
(presenting one of the first models of the cost of contracting).
90. See supra Part II.
91. See generally Steven Shavell, On the Writing and Interpretation of
Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289 (2006).
92. Id. at 295.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 290.
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the extent that they are concerned that the courts would reach
aberrant interpretations otherwise. 97 Thus, the stronger the
track record and reputation of the state judicial system, the
fewer terms one would expect, and the shorter the contract the
parties would write to economize on drafting costs. 98
The analysis above leads to the prediction that contracts
will be shorter and more open-ended when the default rules are
better and the courts that would enforce the contract are more
competent. 99 This is the specific prediction in other incomplete
contract theory papers in the law and economics literature. 100
We combine this prediction from the law and economics
literature with the nearly universal consensus among M&A
lawyers that Delaware has higher quality law and courts. 101
Taken together, we would expect that these two hypotheses
would translate into M&A contracts that are shorter and more
open-ended when subject to Delaware choice of law or forum
than when subject to other states’ laws or courts.
To evaluate this hypothesis, we initially determine the
number and complexity of the terms in the agreements with a
very simple measure—the number of words in the
agreements. 102 Although the number of words is a simple proxy
for the number of terms, it is strongly correlated with the
complexity and detail of the contract. 103 More detailed and
precise instructions covering a greater number of contingencies
require more words, even if carefully described in the most
parsimonious language. 104 Open-ended standards, rather than
rules, are able to economize on words by using phrases such as
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 91–98 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 4, at 1593 (“[C]ontracts are likely to be
shorter the more competent the judges are because lawyers will not have to
spell out everything for a dim interpreter.”).
101. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the
Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1212–14 (2001)
(discussing broad consensus about perceived advantages of Delaware
corporate law and the Delaware judiciary).
102. See infra Part IV.
103. See infra Part IV.
104. See supra Part II.B.

1222

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1197 (2020)

“reasonable,” “good faith,” or “best efforts,” whereas rule-like
contract terms require more words. 105 Thus, we posit that the
number of words is likely the most intuitive measure for
drafting effort intended to overcome undesirable defaults or
unskilled judicial interpreters. For example, Alan Schwartz and
Joel Watson specifically suggested the number of words as a
proposed measure for empirical tests of their theory on
contractual interpretation. 106
Our basic prediction, which we test in Part IV, below, is
whether parties view Delaware’s law and courts as providing
sufficient benefit over those of other states to allow parties to
economize on the number of terms, measured by the number of
words in the agreements.
IV. Data and Methods
A

The Data

We gathered our dataset of public company mergers from
Mergerstat which is available through LexisNexis. 107 The data
include mergers involving public company targets announced
between 2001 and 2014 inclusive. For each transaction, the
Mergerstat data provide information on the announcement
date, deal size, type of consideration, SIC codes of the acquirer
and target, the type of transaction (tender offer, leveraged
buyout, etc.) as well as the law firms involved. We use these
variables as controls in the analysis.
The Mergerstat data do not include the text of the relevant
agreements, so we then used a computer script to match merger
agreements from the EDGAR system with the transactions in
105. See supra Part II.B.
106. See Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, Conceptualizing Contractual
Interpretation, 42 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 32 (2013) (“One can measure contract length
by the number of words.”). Of course, other proxies are possible, such as the
number of sections or subsections. However, transactional drafts often
combine multiple (identical) sections into one or break single sections into
multiple sections, which would give different numbers of terms for the same
exact text. Therefore, we consider such divisions somewhat arbitrary
compared to the number of words.
107. See generally Finding Merger and Acquisition Information on
Lexis.com and Nexis, LEXISNEXIS, https://perma.cc/BQ2K-8LU7.
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the Mergerstat database. 108 This allows us to analyze the
detailed text of each agreement and its relationship to
transaction variables in the database. We were able to match a
total of 1,569 agreements to the approximately 2,869
transactions in the Mergerstat database. 109 We excluded five
transactions that involved bankruptcy reorganizations, and
another six transactions with missing data, yielding a total of
1,558 observations.
For each transaction, we reviewed the relevant agreement
and hand coded the state of incorporation of the acquirer and
target, whether the merger involved a triangular merger
structure, as well as the states of incorporation of any merger
subsidiaries. We also coded the relevant choice of governing law
for the agreement and the exclusive forum selected, if any. 110
These pieces of data provide the key variables of interest in
analyzing the relative effect of choice of law and forum on the
text of the agreements.
The dependent variable in the analysis is the number of
words in each agreement. We used a computer script to
download the 1,558 agreements, remove punctuation and
capital letters, remove exhibits and annexes, and remove tables
108. See Archive Indices of the SEC EDGAR Database, SEC,
https://perma.cc/KD5E-2Z5G.
109. The computer program located the agreements using the names and
dates in the Mergerstat data. The agreements were then hand-verified to
ensure they were correctly matched. In some cases, the script did not locate
the agreements, accounting for the difference between the size of the
Mergerstat database and our data. We believe the missing agreements are
missing at random and would not affect our results.
110. Forum selection clauses commonly come in two types, exclusive (or
mandatory) clauses that specify a forum in which the parties must bring
actions and non-exclusive (or permissive) clauses that specify a forum in which
the parties may bring actions. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection
Agreements in the Federal Courts after Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for
Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 56 n.1 (1992) (defining exclusive
clauses as “an agreement to litigate only in a forum or fora, to the exclusion of
any other fora” and non-exclusive clauses as “an agreement to litigate in the
agreed forum or fora, but not to the exclusion of any other fora that have
jurisdiction and venue”). A variety of other terms are also used for these
categories. See id. (“Some civilian commentators use the term ‘derogation
agreement’ to describe exclusive forum agreements, ‘prorogation agreement’
to describe non-exclusive forum agreements.”).
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of contents. The script then counted the number of words, and
we stored the text of the agreements for further analysis below.
The descriptive statistics for the dataset are displayed in
Table 1 below. As suggested by the Table, our analysis will
control for various elements of the deal structure, law firms
involved, and industry of the target company, as described more
fully in the next Part. 111
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Variable
Mean
Number of Words
State of Incorporation
of Target = DE
Choice of Law = DE
Choice of Forum = DE
Target Incorporation =
DE
Acquirer Incorporation
= DE
Triangular Merger
Structure
Deal Size
Tender Offer
Stock Consideration
LBO
Top 20 Firm Buyer
Top 20 Firm Seller
Banking Industry
REIT Industry

Median

36,308.6
0.62.7

35,651.5
1

Standard
Dev
8,447.0
0.484

0.691
0.610
0.627

1
1
1

0.462
0.488
0.484

0.549

1

0.498

0.873

1

0.333

$2.3 billion
0.179
0.442
0.111
0.448
0.671
0.101
0.096

$702 million
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

$5.5 billion
0.384
0.497
0.314
0.498
0.470
0.301
0.295

The number of words in the merger agreements showed
strong evidence of trends over time. The length of M&A
agreements increased substantially over our approximately
fifteen-year window, adding hundreds of words per year on

111.

See infra Part V.
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average as shown in Panel A of Figure 1, below. 112 However, the
distribution of the number of words in the agreements was
distributed approximately normally with only a slight positive
skew, as shown in Panel B of Figure 1. Accordingly, we include
a time trend in our analysis below to account for the growth in
agreements over time. The approximate normality of the
dependent variable (words per agreement) allows us to use
ordinary least squares and no transformation is necessary to
achieve approximate normality in the dependent variable. 113

112. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 15, at 232 (providing an overview
of the growth of M&A agreements over time).
113. The dependent variable in this model (words per agreement) is
technically a “count” variable and therefore cannot be less than zero and can
only assume integer values. In many cases, count variables require special
models because they are not normally distributed. Panel B of Figure 1 shows
(and our statistical tests confirm) that the number of words per agreement is
approximately normally distributed, eliminating the need for a model
designed for count data.
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Figure 1. The Number of Words in Merger Agreements. Panel A (left) shows
the growth over time. Panel B (right) shows the distribution of the number of
words in the agreements.

As one might expect, the data confirm that choice of law is
correlated strongly with choice of forum. In most cases, the
choice of law and choice of forum were the same (and in most
cases both choices were Delaware). The association between
choice of law and choice of forum is set forth in Table 2A, below.
Although all merger agreements contained a choice of law
clause, roughly 17 percent of agreements did not contain a
choice of forum clause. Similarly, the choice of law was highly
correlated with the target’s state of incorporation, as shown in
Table 2B, below. Table 2C shows that choice of forum is also
highly correlated with state of incorporation of the target
company. However, choice of forum is not found in all
agreements as is choice of law, and Delaware companies are
much more likely to choose exclusive forums than are other
companies, which creates a possible selection bias discussed in
Part V.
Table 2A. Association Between Choice of Law and Choice of
Forum.
DE Choice of
Other Choice of No Choice of
Forum
Forum
Forum
DE Choice of
933
35
108
Law
Other Choice
17
312
153
of Law
Table 2B. Association Between Choice of Law and Target State of
Incorporation.
Target Incorporated in Target Not Incorporated
Delaware
in Delaware
DE Choice of
906
71
Law
Other Choice
170
411
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of Law
Table 2C. Association Between Target State of Incorporation and
Choice of Forum.
DE Choice of
Other Choice
No Choice of
Forum
of Forum
Forum
DE
813
65
99
Incorporation
Other
137
282
162
Incorporation

B.

Two Approaches to Analyzing Delaware’s Defaults

We performed two distinct types of analysis on the merger
agreements. First, we modeled the number of terms in the
agreement using the length of the agreements in words. As
explained above, the more closely parties adhere to default
rules, the less text is necessary. 114 Similarly, the more
predictable and sophisticated the decisions of the tribunal
selected in the agreement’s forum selection clause are, the less
text is necessary to guide the tribunal. 115 Therefore, we model
the length of the agreement by choice of law and choice of forum
with suitable control variables. Because choice of law and choice
of forum are closely correlated, we examine them separately
initially and then together. 116
We then performed a second type of analysis using
classification of the agreement text itself. It is possible that the
number of words in a document may not reveal all the
differences between default rules. Documents may vary based
on choice of law or choice of forum in ways that do not
systematically translate into longer or shorter documents. 117
Therefore, we also use machine-learning techniques to analyze
the documents to look for systematic variations by choice of law
or choice of forum. Specifically, we use a Random Forest
114.
115.
116.
117.

See supra Parts II.B, III.B.
See supra Parts II.B, III.B.
See infra Part V.
See supra Part IV.A.
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classifier to attempt to predict Delaware choice of law versus
non-Delaware choice of law. 118 This analysis is designed to
reveal the most “important” words that distinguish Delaware
from non-Delaware agreements.
We use two very different approaches to analyzing the effect
of Delaware law to ensure we have multiple vantage points on
the differences in Delaware law and forum. Because each
approach uses different methodology (and to some extent
different data), we describe the methodology and results
together for each result one-by-one in Part V.
V. Analysis and Results
A.

Regression Analysis of Document Length

Our regression analysis attempts to analyze the association
between the number of words in M&A agreements and our
jurisdictional variables and control variables. Accordingly we
use the number of words in each agreement as the dependent
variable in a linear model and use least squares to estimate the
relationship with our variables of interest. 119 The key
independent variables of interest are the choice of law (dummy
variable for Delaware versus non-Delaware) and the choice of
forum (dummy variable for Delaware versus non-Delaware).
These two (choice of law and choice of forum) are highly
correlated, 120 so we will present separate regressions for each,
as well as their connection to the target’s and acquirer’s state(s)
of incorporation.
We include a number of control variables in the analysis to
account for two types of potentially confounding effects. First,
some variables are known to affect the length of merger
agreements. In particular, merger agreements where the
118. Random Forests use an ensemble of decision trees to make
predictions. See, e.g., David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What
Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
653, 681–83 (2017) (discussing how machine-learning algorithms can be used
to construct educated guesses about missing values in data sets).
119. See DOUGLAS C. MONTGOMERY, ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 14–16 (3d ed. 2001) (providing an explanation of least
squares regression).
120. See supra Tables 2A–C.
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consideration includes stock are lengthier than those where the
consideration is solely cash because of the need for more
deal-specific and securities related provisions, so we introduce a
variable for whether the transaction is cash only. 121 Banking
merger agreements are also often shorter than other merger
agreements, in part because of a common practice of the
acquirer and target making the same representations and
warranties. 122 In addition, real estate investment trusts often
have longer merger agreements because they often have more
complex corporate structures including operating partnerships
that require multiple layers of mergers. 123 Accordingly, we
include dummy variables for two industry groups represented
in the data, banking (SIC codes beginning with sixty) 124 and real
estate investment trusts (SIC groups beginning with
sixty-seven). 125 Finally, the length of agreements has increased
over time. 126 Some commentators argue this is the result of
textual accumulation over time, 127 while others argue it may
relate to rational responses to a changed environment. 128 In
either case, we use year fixed effects to control for this possible
confounding variable.

121. The principal reason for the difference is that representations and
warranties on the part of the acquirer are much more extensive in a stock
transaction than in a cash transaction.
122. See, e.g., Zions Bancorporation, Agreement and Plan of Merger Dated
July 5, 2005, SEC, https://perma.cc/9FYZ-V7YB (setting forth a single Article
V on reciprocal representations and warranties of both parties).
123. See infra Tables 3–5.
124. Previous work has shown that merger agreements in the banking
industry are more closely related to one another than other types of
agreements, and as a result are textually different from other agreements. See
Anderson & Manns, supra note 16, at 73 (noting patterns in use of firm
precedent).
125. The results were similar when we incorporated control variables for
all two-digit SIC codes.
126. See supra Figure 1.
127. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 16, at 76 (discussing the growth
of the median word count of merger agreements over time).
128. See John C. Coates IV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence
from Twenty Years of Deals 2 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working
Paper No. 333, 2016), https://perma.cc/B2PH-AQRF (PDF) (describing types of
“rational responses”).
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The second category of controls relates to “deal complexity.”
We include these controls because more complex deals may be
correlated with both longer agreements and Delaware choice of
law or forum. Accordingly, we include controls for the logged
equity value of the deal, on the theory that larger deals might
have longer merger agreements. 129 We also include controls for
major deal structure elements, such as whether the transaction
involves a tender offer or a leveraged buyout—structures that
may introduce drafting complexities. 130 Finally, we include a
dummy variable for whether the seller’s law firm was a “Top 20”
M&A firm and the buyer’s law firm was a “Top 20” M&A firm, 131
on the theory that more complex deals may involve more active
M&A firms or that more active M&A firms may include more
detail in agreements. Finally, we include a control for whether
the structure of the merger is triangular or direct, as triangular
mergers typically entail extra verbiage in the merger agreement
to account for the complexities of the three-party deal
structure. 132
The first set of results is presented in Table 3, below. In
Table 3 we present models for the relevant Delaware variables
by themselves in Model 1, then together with transaction
controls added in Model 2, then with industry controls added in
Model 3. The choice of forum and target state of incorporation
129. For the total value of the deal we used Mergerstat’s “Base Equity
Price” data point. See FACTSET MERGERSTAT, MERGERSTAT REVIEW (2020) (on
file with author).
130. See infra Tables 3–6.
131. We ascertained the “top 20” firms from the most common firms
appearing in the dataset. The “top 20” firms were, in order, Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom; Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; Latham & Watkins;
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett; Sullivan & Cromwell; Cravath, Swaine & Moore;
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell; Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati; Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton; Jones Day; Weil, Gotshal & Manges; Hogan
Lovells; Davis Polk & Wardwell; Shearman & Sterling; Baker Botts; Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher; Goodwin Procter; Morgan, Lewis & Bockius; O’Melveny &
Myers; and Ropes & Gray. We also ran the regression with individual dummy
variables for these firms, which did not change the results materially. We
apologize in advance to partners and associates at “Top 20” firms who did not
make the cut as we are just focusing on M&A transactions and volume of M&A
deals rather than quality or dollar amount of transactions as is often the focus
of other M&A law firm rankings.
132.
See infra Tables 3–6.
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are highly correlated with the choice of law. Therefore, the key
variable of interest in our analysis (choice of law) is also
presented separately in Model 4 without those other variables.

Table 3. Modeling Agreement Length by Choice of Law, Choice of
Forum, and Incorporation
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Constant
36,242.2* 5653.6*
5485.2
3998.0
**
(2612.1)
(2615.2)
(2565.7)
(483.4)
Target
-1207.6*
-1153.8*
Incorporated in
2330.3** (492.4)
(490.7)
Delaware
*
(584.8)
Acquirer
276.0
354.2
414.1
Incorporated in
(440.2)
(376.3)
(376.3)
Delaware
Delaware Choice
of Law
Delaware Choice
of Forum
No Choice of
Forum

2129.1*
(855.2)
827.6
(869.6)
3574.5**

2273.1**
(710.5)
-753.0
(725.0)
-2071.4
(634.2)

2102.6**
(707.5)
-584.6
(719.2)
-1885.2**
(636.0)

1150.0**
(418.8)
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(Non-Triangular)
Merger
Years After 2001
Tender Offer
Stock
Consideration
LBO
Log (Deal Size)
Top 20 Firm
Buyer
Top 20 Firm
Seller
Banking
Industry
REIT Industry
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*
(720.3)

3265.5**
*
(621.2)
990.1***
(49.4)
2460.9**
*
(502.7)
7303.3**
*
(431.4)
1998.2**
(614.0)

2598.3***
(702.0)

956.2***
(125.7)
-57.5
(369.2)
343.6
(385.8)

967.0***
(125.1)
41.1
(366.3)
352.4
(382.7)
2549.9***
(747.2)

965.0***
(49.4)
2481.0***
(500.8)
7310.4***
(427.9)
1956.2**
(608.9)

1794.5*
(719.6)
0.3676
0.3614

R-Squared
0.049
0.3551
Adjusted
0.046
0.3496
R-Squared
No. Observations 1558
1558
1558
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 95%, 99%, and
99.9% levels, respectively.

2955.1**
*
(697.5)
971.2***
(48.8)
2404.9**
*
(500.9)
7351.0**
*
(428.1)
2079.5**
*
(595.1)
954.2***
(125.1)
53.7
(365.9)
287.0
(381.6)
2491.4**
*
(744.5)
1914.8**
(711.0)
0.3642
0.3593
1558

The Table reveals some interesting findings regarding the
relationship of Delaware law to agreement length. Delaware
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choice of law is associated with a statistically significant
increase in the length of the agreements, and that is true across
all the specifications in Models 1–4, regardless of the controls
introduced. In terms of magnitude, the choice of Delaware law
is associated with approximately 1000–2000 additional words in
the merger agreements, depending on the control variables
included in the model. This result is the opposite of the
incomplete contract theory prediction that high-quality
Delaware law would allow drafters to rely on defaults and
economize on detailed terms. 133
The control variables offer some expected results and some
surprises. As was expected, agreements increase steadily in
length as time passes, adding about one thousand words per
year. 134 Stock transactions are very strongly associated with
longer agreements, primarily because of the lengthier
representations and warranties of the acquirer in a stock
transaction. Tender offers and leveraged buyouts (LBO) are
associated with longer agreements, as one might expect given
the increased complexity. The logged transaction size was
strongly positively associated with longer agreements, as
drafting effort is proportionately less costly on a larger
transaction. Direct (as opposed to triangular) merger structures
saved about three thousand words, as the mechanics of these
transactions are less complex.
The results for some of the control variables are surprising,
however. In particular, the identity of the law firms did not
appear to significantly affect the length of the agreements when
other variables were controlled. This is surprising because one
might expect that more prominent M&A firms would be
retained in more complex deals, and that more complex deals
would involve longer agreements. Indeed, the coefficients on the
“Top 20” M&A firms were positive and significant in an
(unreported) model in which transaction size was not controlled.
However, controlling for transaction size almost completely
neutralized this effect, suggesting that the transaction size
control is capable of controlling for almost all “deal complexity”

133.
134.

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See supra Figure 1.
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effects. 135 The fact that the more prominent M&A firms do not
seem independently associated with agreement length helps to
alleviate the concern that some other confounding variable
related to deal complexity accounts for the main results.
Digging deeper into the key Delaware variables of interest,
there are a few broad observations and a few more specific ones.
First, the Table makes it clear that the target’s state of
incorporation, choice of law, and choice of forum coefficients all
have relatively small magnitudes compared to some of the other
variables. The state of the acquirer’s incorporation was not
associated with differences in the lengths of the agreements at
all.
Second, the Delaware choice of forum variable is not
significant and even switches sign as control variables are
added. On the one hand, choice of forum and choice of law are
correlated. Indeed, the choice of forum is, to a large extent, a
subset of the choice of law because all agreements in the dataset
selected governing law but not all selected an exclusive forum.
As a result, when the choice of forum was included in an
unreported regression separately (without choice of law) it had
a positive and statistically significant sign (associated with
more words). However, as the control variables were added to
that regression, the magnitude of that coefficient and its
statistical significance declined. This suggests that Delaware
choice of forum, to the extent it is associated with anything
beyond choice of law, is merely a signal for increased deal
complexity. This is further bolstered by the fact in Table 3 that
deals that fail to choose a forum are about 3,600 words shorter
when deal complexity controls are not included, but only about
1,900 words shorter when those controls are included. In
contrast, Delaware choice of law continued to have an
association with longer agreements regardless of the control
variables added.
A second point about the effect of the choice of Delaware law
is that its association with longer agreements is reduced for
target companies incorporated in Delaware. Of course, the
target’s state of incorporation is strongly associated with both
Delaware choice of law and Delaware choice of forum. Although
135.

See infra Part VI.B.2.
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an agreement for the acquisition of a Delaware target can (and
sometimes does) choose law or forum other than Delaware, in
most cases the state of target incorporation and the choice of law
are the same, as is the exclusive forum if one is selected. 136
Although the target state of incorporation, choice of law, and
choice of forum are highly correlated, they are not perfectly
correlated.
The result that Delaware choice of law is associated with a
smaller increase of words for Delaware companies than for
non-Delaware companies is a potentially interesting one.
Approximately one-third of the transactions in the database are
“All Delaware” in the sense that they involved a target and
acquirer incorporated in Delaware, a Delaware choice of law,
and a Delaware choice of forum. Accordingly, we present a table
that compares the results of “All Delaware” merger agreements
versus other merger agreements. Table 4 below shows how the
length of those merger agreements compares to other merger
agreements.
Table 4. Modeling Agreement Length by “All Delaware” Status.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Constant
36,504.5***
5862.4*
5830.7*
(296.8)
(2618.8)
(2615.3)
All Delaware (All
1287.9**
414.8
398.2
Legal Variables
(469.6)
(398.7)
(400.2)
Are Delaware)
No Choice of
-3725.5***
-1707.4**
-1558.6**
Forum
(592.4)
(551.4)
(555.7)
Direct
-3516.5***
-2713.4***
(Non-Triangular)
(615.5)
(703.6)
Merger
Years After 2001
994.0***
971.4***
(48.9)
(49.0)
Tender Offer
2455.5***
2457.1***
(502.2)
(501.4)

136. See generally supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing
factors influencing forum choice).
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7324.6***
(433.1)
2025.1***
(608.3)
961.8***
(125.5)
-8.8
(369.2)
323.7
(385.3)

7338.6***
(429.6)
1991.6***
(603.2)
969.4***
(125.2)
89.9
(366.4)
339.4
(381.8)
-2813.0***
(733.4)
1568.8*
(697.4)
0.362
0.357

R-Squared
0.040
0.349
Adjusted
0.039
0.345
R-Squared
No. Observations
1558
1558
1558
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% levels,
respectively.

The “All Delaware” variable is significant only in Model 1,
and is positive but not significant in Models 2 and 3. However,
even in Model 3 where the effect is not statistically significant
and smallest, the confidence interval for the “All Delaware”
coefficient is -386.9 to 1,183.2. The fact that the coefficient is not
significant means we cannot reject with 95 percent confidence
the hypothesis that “All Delaware” has no effect on the number
of words in the agreement. However, the standard error is small
enough that we can reject with 95 percent confidence the
hypothesis that “All Delaware” deals reduce the number of
words more than 386.9 (or increase them more than 1,183.2). In
other words, although it is possible in this analysis that “All
Delaware” deals are associated with slightly shorter
agreements, such an effect, if any, is small. In other words, this
result still supports the notion that Delaware law does not offer
any substantial drafting advantage over the law of other states,
even in the model most favorable to finding such an advantage.
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The above analysis demonstrates that the Delaware choice
of law is not associated with shorter agreements, and indeed
most of the models associated Delaware choice of law with
longer agreements. However, one might still question whether
the analysis definitively establishes no drafting advantage to
Delaware law. For example, despite the controls used in the
above analysis, it is possible the Delaware agreements reflect
greater transaction complexity that we have not adequately
controlled for. The fact that the most prominent M&A firms do
not affect document length tends to minimize this concern.
Fortunately, we do not need to rely entirely on that fact, as we
have a very powerful additional control variable we can
introduce—the length of the precedent agreement on which
each deal was likely based. 137 By controlling for the length of the
precedent agreement, we can control for most of the residual
factors that might influence agreement length. 138
We are able to control for the length of the document used
as a precedent for each transaction because of a prior analysis
we performed on the evolution of merger agreements. 139 In that
study we used computer analysis to identify the most likely
precedent agreement for each public company acquisition
agreement in a broader 1994–2014 data set and showed that
most M&A agreements can be traced to their precedent
documents. 140 Using the results from the previous analysis we
identified the most likely precedent agreement in our dataset
and determined the number of words in each such precedent. In
Table 5, below, we add a variable for the number of words in the
precedent agreements (where they could be found). Table 5
below presents the full models from Table 3 and Table 4 with
the additional variable of precedent length added.
137. See infra Table 5.
138. See infra Table 5.
139. See, e.g., Anderson & Manns, supra note 16, at 66 (showing the high
degree of editorial churning on a macro-level for acquisition agreements);
Anderson & Manns, supra note 15, at 222–25 (highlighting the high degree of
textual changes within the micro-level of the text of boilerplate terms in M&A
acquisition agreements, which reinforces the editorial churning hypothesis).
140. See generally Anderson & Manns, supra note 14 (discussing how
insights about macro-level agreement drift suggest potential pathways to
greater efficiency in M&A drafting).
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Table 5. Choice of Law, Forum, and Incorporation with Control for
Precedent Length.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Individual
“All
Delaware
Delaware
Delaware”
Choice
of
Variables
versus not Law
“All
Delaware”
Constant
-665.5
-585.7
-1836.4
(2209.6)
(2208.6)
(2168)
All Legal Variables
227.6
Are Delaware
(334.4)
Target
-1009.0*
Incorporated in
(411.0)
Delaware
Acquirer
21.7
Incorporated in
(316.0)
Delaware
Delaware Choice of 1597.8**
776.9*
Law
(592.9)
(350.7)
Delaware Choice of -356.5
Forum
(602.7)
No Choice of
-1295.1*
-1086.0*
Forum
(537.4)
(468.4)
Direct
-1551.6**
-1637.9**
-1806.4***
(Non-Triangular)
(590.8)
(591.6)
(586.2)
Merger
Years After 2001
440.4***
445.0***
472.5***
(46.3)
(46.0)
(44.4)
Tender Offer
2068.2***
2042.2***
1994.6***
(418.6)
(418.7)
(419.0)
Stock
5530.6***
5528.8***
5444.8***
Consideration
(366.7)
(368.1)
(365.3)
LBO
1971.2***
1906.5***
1954.7***
(508.4)
(503.1)
(497.3)
Log (Deal Size)
657.5***
656.7***
677.8***
(105.7)
(105.6)
(104.9)
Top 20 Firm Buyer -3.4
9.3
11.9
(306.4)
(306.1)
(306.1)
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Top 20 Firm Seller
Banking Industry
REIT Industry

285.4
(320.5)
-1450.5*
(628.2)
901.3
(607.3)
0.517***
(0.021)
0.557
0.552

258.8
(319.6)
-1637.9**
(591.6)
832.0
(588.2)
0.520***
(0.021)
0.554
0.550

232.4
(320.0)
-1573.6*
(618.4)
866.8
(593.7)
0.521***
(0.020)
0.553
0.550

Words in Precedent
Document
R-Squared
Adjusted
R-Squared
No. Observations
1542
1542
1542
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9%
levels, respectively.

The introduction of this variable increases the fit of the
model substantially, as the length of the precedent used
strongly predicts the length of the agreement. However, the
other variables remain largely unchanged. Delaware choice of
law continues to be a significant and positive predictor of longer
agreements when isolated as a standalone variable (columns 1
and 3). The “All Delaware” agreement variable continues to be
positive, although it loses its significance in Model 2. Thus, the
key finding of the difference in length for Delaware choice of law
remained statistically significant even when we accounted for
the differences in the length of the precedent starting points for
the drafting of the acquisition agreements.
Next, we turn to another possible objection to our
conclusion that Delaware law does not enable shorter
agreements. The overall length of agreements is predicted to
vary by the quality of law and tribunals in the law and
economics literature, 141 but it is possible our analysis has not
homed in on the “important” aspects of the agreements. Our
analysis thus far has documented the overall increases (or at
least no decreases) in the length of Delaware acquisition
agreements, but it is possible that the important parts of
141.

See supra Part II.B.

1240

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1197 (2020)

agreements are shorter when Delaware law governs, and that
we failed to detect those differences. In particular, it is possible
that the superiority of Delaware law allows shorter, more
open-ended terms in the important deal terms, but that those
important deal terms are swamped by lengthier boilerplate
provisions in the Delaware agreements.
In order to address this issue, we now perform the same
word-count analysis on one specific provision that is highly
negotiated and closely studied in M&A—the material adverse
change (MAC) clause (also referred to as material adverse
effect—“MAE”) definition. 142 The MAC clause is an important
one from the standpoint of the literature on contract design,

142. See generally Choi & Triantis, supra note 4 (arguing that before
closing the deal, the intentional vagueness of MAC clauses creates more
efficient incentives for the seller, rather than more precise and less costly
proxies); Yair Y. Galil, MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed
Economy, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 846 (2002) (discussing how unclear
judicial interpretations of the contours of MAC clauses and MAE clauses cast
a shadow over merger deals); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz,
Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
330 (2005) (using economic modeling to analyze the role that MAC and MAE
clauses play in the structure of the standard acquisition agreement and the
incentive effects for acquirers and targets); Robert T. Miller, Canceling the
Deal: Two Models of Material Adverse Change Clauses in Business
Combination Agreements, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 99 (2009) (advocating a judicial
framework for interpreting MAC clauses that places the burden of material
changes on targets and the burden of immaterial changes on acquirers during
the closing period); Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating
Risk Through MAC Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2007 (2009) (arguing that the reciprocal allocations of deal risk
in MAC clauses serve to further efficiency in transactions by decreasing the
likelihood that parties will exercise termination rights); Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926 (2010)
(arguing for interpretative default rules in construing MAC clauses); Andrew
A. Schwartz, A “Standard Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine and the
Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2010) (arguing that
MAC clauses transform conventional default rules by (1) allowing a
contractual exit in cases of frustration of secondary purposes or partial loss of
value and (2) shifting exogenous risk from the acquirer to the target); Eric L.
Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual Conditions, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 755 (2009) (arguing that MAE clauses are a tool for allocating the
risk of market uncertainty present while negotiating the acquisition
agreement).
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having been front and center in one of the leading articles. 143
The clause is uniquely suited for testing these hypotheses,
because it is one of the most important moving pieces in the
merger agreement, and yet relies to a large extent on the
background or default rules of state law. 144
We collected the textual definitions for “material adverse
effect” for the 1,382 agreements in our database for which such
definitions were available. 145 We then analyzed the word counts
for these MAC definitions using the same variables as we used
in Tables 3 and 4 above. The MAC definitions were reasonably
normally distributed and symmetric like the documents as a
whole, with mean of 377.2 words, median of 363, and standard
deviation of 167.7.
Table 6. Modeling Length of Material Adverse Effect Definition.
Individual
All
Choice of
Delaware
Delaware
Delaware
Variables
Variables
Law
Present
Constant
-148.0
-139.7**
-152.2
All Legal Variables
11.7
Are Delaware
(8.0)
Target
9.1
Incorporated in
(9.8)
Delaware
Acquirer
0.9
Incorporated in
(7.5)
Delaware
Delaware Choice of 19.4
19.0*
143. See, e.g., Choi & Triantis, supra note 4, at 852–54 (using the MAC
clause as an illustration of the tradeoff between vagueness and drafting costs
in the context of contract design).
144. See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 142, at 357–58 (discussing how
MAC clauses manage transaction risk without court input).
145. We collected the definitions with a computer script and then checked
them manually. In some cases, the outer bounds of the “definition” were
unclear, so we used a rule that each definition could consist of one sentence
only. In the vast majority of cases, that rule captured the entire definition, but
in some cases it excluded text that was arguably part of the definition but
contained in a separate sentence.
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Law
Delaware Choice of
Forum
No Choice of Forum
Direct
(Non-Triangular)
Merger
Years After 2001
Tender Offer
Stock
Consideration
LBO
Log (Deal Size)
Top 20 Firm Buyer
Top 20 Firm Seller
Banking Industry
REIT Industry

(14.1)
-9.2
(14.3)
-10.7
(12.6)
-5.8
(13.9)

(8.3)
-5.6
(11.0)
-6.1
(13.9)

24.9***
(0.98)
28.8**
(10.1)
-33.9***
(8.5)
32.7**
(12.1)
16.7***
(12.1)
0.03
(7.3)
7.7
(7.6)
-35.3*
(14.7)
-33.9*
(14.2)
0.394
0.387

24.7***
(1.0)
29.7**
(10.1)
-34.4***
(8.5)
30.6*
(11.9)
16.8***
(2.5)
0.7
(7.3)
9.0
(7.6)
-40.6**
(14.5)
-40.1**
(13.7)
0.392
0.387

29.1**
(10.1)
-34.2***
(8.4)
33.2**
(11.8)
16.8***
(2.5)
0.5
(7.2)
8.4
(7.6)
-37.7**
(14.5)
-36.6**
(13.8)
0.393
0.388

R-Squared
Adjusted
R-Squared
No. Observations
1382
1382
1382
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% levels,
respectively.

The results in this Table, based on the length of MAC
clauses, parallel those above based on the length of entire
agreements for our key variables of interest. 146 Delaware choice
146.

See supra Table 6.
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of law is positive in all models and significant when the highly
correlated other Delaware variables are excluded. In Models 1
and 2 where the Delaware choice of law and “All Delaware”
variables are not significant, the confidence intervals reduce
any possible “Delaware effect” to a narrow range—literally
single digit numbers of words for a definition averaging nearly
400 words. Thus, the analysis on individual MAC definitions
parallels that for agreements as a whole. The only interesting
difference is that the use of stock consideration in a merger
leads to substantially shorter MAC definitions, whereas it leads
to substantially longer agreements as a whole.
This analysis of MAC clauses confirms the findings based
on entire agreements—that the choices of Delaware law and
courts do not enable drafters to economize on contractual
language. 147 Both agreements as a whole 148 and MAC clauses in
particular do not differ significantly in length based on
Delaware choice of law or choice of forum. Indeed, Delaware
choice of law in particular is generally associated with an
increased number of words in the agreements compared to
reliance on the law and courts of other states.
The results of our analysis above suggest that Delaware law
or forum is not a substitute for contractual complexity. Our
analysis does not necessarily demonstrate, however, that there
are no important systematic differences between agreements
drafted under Delaware and non-Delaware law. First, it is
possible that our analysis based purely on the length of
agreements in words may miss systematic differences between
Delaware and non-Delaware agreements for a variety of
reasons. Second, some of the economic models discussed above
predicted that certain types of court sophistication may produce
longer agreements, rather than shorter ones. 149 These different
types of sophistication could offset one another producing a zero
net result.
We therefore also perform some checks to examine the
substance of the agreements themselves to determine how
147. See supra Tables 3–6.
148. See supra Tables 3–6.
149. See supra Part IV (discussing collected data and approaches to
analyzing Delaware’s default rules).
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Delaware agreements differ from agreements governed by the
law or forum of other states. We do this in the next section,
where we deploy machine-learning techniques to examine how
Delaware agreements differ textually from non-Delaware
agreements.
B.

Classification of Agreements Based on Textual Content

In this section we go beyond word counts to examine the
textual content of the merger agreements using computer-based
statistical techniques. Our goal in this section is to determine
whether there are textual features that differ systematically
between Delaware and non-Delaware agreements that may not
show up in overall word counts. To conduct this analysis, we use
a Random Forest classifier to attempt to differentiate Delaware
from non-Delaware agreements. 150 If the classifier is able to
reliably distinguish Delaware from non-Delaware agreements
based on meaningful textual features, then we may have
evidence that lawyers draft differently based on underlying law.
If, however, the classifier is unable to distinguish between
Delaware and non-Delaware agreements (or can distinguish
only based on superficial features), that fact would support the
conclusion from the agreement length analysis that lawyers do
not draft significantly differently based on Delaware or
non-Delaware law.
150. We also examined the documents’ content using Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA), a statistical technique developed specifically for modeling
text documents. See David M. Blei, et al., Latent Dirichlet Allocation, 3 J.
MACHINE LEARNING RES. 993, 996 (2003) (defining LDA as a “generative
probabilistic model of a corpus”). We first perform an unsupervised LDA model
on a larger set of merger agreements that include both public company and
private company acquisitions. This larger set of documents is drawn from the
dataset we developed in a previous article. See Anderson & Manns, supra note
16, at 68–70 (collecting merger agreements filed with the SEC between 1994
and 2014). The unsupervised model produced indistinct topics that failed to
clearly distinguish between Delaware agreements and non-Delaware
agreements. We then perform a supervised LDA model on the public company
merger agreement set with Delaware choice of forum as the class. The
supervised model has two classes, Delaware choice of law and non-Delaware
choice of law. The results were similar when all states were treated as
separate classes. The supervised model performed better, but still failed to
clearly distinguish between Delaware and non-Delaware agreements.
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For the Random Forest analysis, we randomly divided the
agreements into a training set of 1,258 agreements and a test
set of 300 agreements. We removed terms that existed in
substantially all documents and terms that existed in very few
documents (fewer than twenty) to eliminate many proper nouns
and similar words. We also eliminated stop words and
punctuation, as is standard in textual classification.
The Random Forest classifier was able to predict Delaware
choice of law with some degree of accuracy, as the following
Table indicates. When the choice of law was actually Delaware,
the classifier was correct 196 times and incorrect only 9 times.
When the choice of law was actually a state other than
Delaware, the classifier was correct 64 times and incorrect 31
times. This is a typical result when one class (here Delaware) is
more common than the other class (here non-Delaware).

Table 7. Random Forest Predictions
Delaware
Predicted
Delaware Actual
196
Non-Delaware Actual 31

Non-Delaware
Predicted
9
64

The initial results might suggest differential drafting
between Delaware and non-Delaware. However, upon
inspection of the individual words that predict Delaware versus
non-Delaware, it is apparent that the prediction was largely
based on relatively superficial characteristics of the documents.
The strongest predictors of Delaware law were words such as
“Delaware,” “DGCL” (the Delaware General Corporation Law),
and “Chancery.” Below is a Table illustrating the fifteen most
important words (in terms of Gini coefficient decrease) in
predicting Delaware versus non-Delaware choice of law.
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Table 8. Most Important Terms Predicting Delaware or
Non-Delaware Incorporation
Term
delaware
Dgcl
Articles

Importance
19.97
17.56
9.51

chancery
stockholder
stockholders
shareholder

8.98
8.68
6.91
5.89

shareholders

5.01

appraisal
Estate

3.32
2.76

secretary
commonwealth

2.71
2.43

Direction
Predicts Delaware
Predicts Delaware
Predicts
Non-Delaware
Predicts Delaware
Predicts Delaware
Predicts Delaware
Predicts
Non-Delaware
Predicts
Non-Delaware
Predicts Delaware
Predicts
Non-Delaware
Predicts Delaware
Predicts
Non-Delaware
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Hsr
maryland

2.02
1.95

Reit

1.84

Predicts Delaware
Predicts
Non-Delaware
Predicts
Non-Delaware

As an example of the predictive power of these superficial
terms, consider the word “Delaware” used in an agreement.
Because so few companies are physically located in Delaware, 151
the primary reason for that word to appear in an agreement is
because the agreement is governed by Delaware law or one of
the companies is incorporated in Delaware (in which case the
agreement is usually governed by Delaware law). As a result,
the number of times the word “Delaware” appears in an
agreement dramatically affects the probability the model
predicts Delaware governing law, as illustrated in the figure
below.

151. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 5, at 389–91 (displaying the
disparity in the number of publicly traded firms incorporated in Delaware and
states with the largest number of publicly traded firms’ corporate
headquarters).
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Of course, there are also words that strongly predict
non-Delaware choice of law. As an example, the following figure
shows the predictive effect of the number of times the word
“shareholder” appears in an agreement. When “shareholder”
does not appear in an agreement, the agreement is governed by
Delaware law about 80 percent of the time. When the word
“shareholder” appears more than ten times, the probability the
agreement is governed by Delaware law drops to about 50
percent. In Delaware, those who own shares of stock are
generally referred to under the Delaware General Corporation
Law as “stockholders,” while in most other state corporate codes
such persons are referred to as “shareholders.”
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In contrast, the first arguably substantive term in the list
of most important terms, “appraisal,” has a much smaller
impact as shown in the Figure below. 152 This is telling because
the fact of appraisal for cash mergers under Delaware law is not
even a default rule that the drafters can contract around; it is a
mandatory rule to which the drafters must merely acquiesce. 153
152. The term “appraisal” tends to predict Delaware law (really Delaware
incorporation of the target company), because Delaware provides appraisal
rights when cash is the consideration, which many states do not. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2) (2019) (detailing stockholder appraisal rights).
153. But see Manti Holdings v. Authentix Acquisition Co., No. CV
2017-0887-SG, 2019 WL 3814453, at *3 n.20 (Del. Ch. 2019)
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Thus, the word likely does not reflect an effort to contract
around or accept default provisions—merely the acceptance of
mandatory rules.

Overall, the results show that the Random Forest classifier
was effective in distinguishing Delaware choice of law from
non-Delaware choice of law, but did so largely based on
superficial state-specific terminology, not based in substantive
The [appraisal] right is mandatory, I presume, in that it exists for
all stockholders of Delaware corporations by statute. It is not
mandatory in that stockholders must pursue appraisal, or that an
appraisal action must proceed in every instance in which statutory
appraisal is permitted under the DGCL. To the contrary,
stockholders must meet certain procedural requirements to invoke
appraisal rights, and stockholders are deemed to have waived
appraisal rights if those requirements are not satisfied. (citations
omitted).

1251

CONTRACT DESIGN

transactional terms. In other words, we found no evidence
lawyers drafted different substantive terms under Delaware
law, only that they adapted the merger agreements to the
different terminology and mandatory terms of Delaware law.
Accordingly, we ran another Random Forest classifier after
having removed these superficial markers for Delaware or
non-Delaware corporate law. 154 The terms removed are listed in
Table 9.

Table 9. Superficial Terms
Removed.
Terms Removed
delaware, maryland, york,
pennsylvania, massachusetts,
texas, california, virginia,
commonwealth, florida, indiana,
nevada, jersey, minnesota,
washington, carolina
Articles

stockholders, shareholders,
stockholder, shareholder
dgcl, mgcl, bca, pbcl, tbca, sdat,
department, cgcl, vsca, nybcl,
nrs, fbca
chancery

secretary

154.

See infra Table 10.

Explanation
Names or partial names of
states

The corporate charter is called
“articles” of incorporation in
most states and a “certificate”
of incorporation in Delaware
The holders of stock are called
“stockholders” in Delaware and
“shareholders” in most other
states
Names, parts of names, or
abbreviations for various state
corporation code and agencies
The trial court chosen in most
Delaware choice of law
provisions is the Court of
Chancery
Delaware Secretary of State
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borough
southern

manhattan
fdic, reit, hsr, banking, bank,
deposits, deposit, banks,
bancorp, antitrust, taxable,
governors, frb, irs, hart, rodino,
bhc, bancshares, leach, bliley,
comptroller
appraisal, adoption, dissenters

Common in exclusive forum
provisions choosing New York
courts
Refers to Southern District of
New York, common in
provisions choosing New York
Courts.
Common in exclusive forum
provisions choosing New York
courts
Words merely indicating
industry or federal regulatory
environment unrelated to state
corporate law
Terms associated with
mandatory rules of Delaware
law

Once the terms in Table 9 had been removed, we re-ran the
Random Forest classifier and obtained the following results in
Table 10. Although the classifier still performs better than
random, 155 it now predicts Delaware choice of law too often, and
even predicts Delaware choice of law more often than not when
the actual choice of law is not Delaware.

155. A null model would always predict Delaware choice of law as
Delaware choice of law is the most common. It would have been correct 203
times and incorrect 97 times. The actual Random Forest classifier with
superficial predictive terms removed was correct 219 times and incorrect 81
times. By way of comparison, before the removal of the superficial predictive
terms the Random Forest classifier was correct 260 times and incorrect 40
times, as indicated by Table 7.
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Table 10. Random Forest Predictions after Removal of Superficial
Terms
Delaware Predicted
Non-Delaware
Predicted
Delaware Actual
187
16
Non-Delaware
55
42
Actual

Our results from this text classification parallel those from
our regression analysis above. 156 The selection of Delaware law
does not translate into systematic differences in textual
patterns relative to agreements selecting non-Delaware law. 157
This finding reinforces the thesis that lawyers do not draft
significantly differently based on a reliance on Delaware or
non-Delaware law and casts doubt on the claims of the
distinctive appeal of Delaware’s legal framework and
judiciary. 158 Alternatively, as we discuss below, these findings
may raise doubt about the completeness of the explanations
underpinning incomplete contract theory. 159 We do not see
greater reliance on Delaware statutory and judicial defaults in
contracting in spite of the confidence that lawyers appear to
place in Delaware as the primary locus of incorporations and
M&A litigation. 160
VI. Discussion
A.

The Results and Their Interpretation

The key results from our analysis are twofold. First,
lawyers do not appear to use reliance on Delaware law or
Delaware courts as a substitute for detailed contractual
terms. 161 Delaware-governed agreements are no shorter and
156. See supra Part V.A.
157. See supra Table 10 (providing results of Random Forest predictions
after removal of superficial terms).
158. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
159. See infra Part VI.
160. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
161. See supra Part V.
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generally appear to be longer than agreements governed by the
law of other states. 162 Second, to the extent that there are
systematic differences between Delaware and non-Delaware
agreements, those differences relate primarily to relatively
superficial differences in terminology between the states, not to
substantive adaptations to different legal rules. 163
These findings have significant implications for contractual
drafting and debates about the value of Delaware law. It
suggests that there is a gap between the professed and revealed
confidence in Delaware law and courts. 164 Contrary to the praise
that M&A lawyers frequently lavish on Delaware, lawyers
appear to place no greater reliance on Delaware than
non-Delaware defaults when engaged in drafting agreements. 165
The finding that acquisition agreements with Delaware choice
of law are statistically significantly longer in most of our models
than their non-Delaware counterparts suggests that lawyers’
practical confidence in Delaware is no greater than the
confidence that they place in other jurisdictions. 166 Otherwise
the Delaware agreements would be shorter as parties could rely
on statutory provisions, judicial precedents, and reliable court
interpretation to a greater extent to fill potential gaps in the
agreement. 167 Even the most favorable models for Delaware
show that Delaware agreements are no shorter than their
non-Delaware counterparts. 168 This conclusion potentially calls
into question the extent whether a “Delaware difference” in
business law and adjudication exists and raises the issue of
whether Delaware’s allure preeminence results entirely from

162. See supra Table 3 and proceeding discussion summarizing regression
analysis results.
163. See supra Table 10 (displaying predictions of incorporation state after
removal of superficial contract terms).
164. See, e.g., Carney, Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 134–42
(pointing to survey data to argue that lawyers’ confidence in and reliance on
Delaware corporate law is based both on Delaware’s reputation and lawyers’
ignorance of the alternative corporate law frameworks offered by other states).
165. For data underlying this assertion, see supra Part V.
166. See supra Part V.A.
167. See supra Part II.B.
168. See supra Part V.A.
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substance rather than process—specifically path dependence. 169
The Delaware statutory and judicial defaults do not appear to
matter in the contracting context where the added value of
Delaware should shape lawyers’ decision-making. 170
An alternative, yet complementary conclusion is that the
logic of incomplete contract theory may simply not correlate
closely to the empirical reality of contractual drafting. 171 M&A
lawyers may not be calibrating the terms of public M&A
contracts to economize on drafting by leveraging the existing
statutory and judicial defaults in Delaware (or for the defaults
for transactions grounded in other states’ law). This finding
raises questions about the predictive power of the incomplete
contract theory, as it may be that lawyers are either less aware
of or responsive to legal defaults than incomplete contract
theory expects they would be. 172 Lawyers’ confidence in
Delaware may be genuine as evidenced by the large extent to
which lawyers steer incorporations and M&A litigation towards
Delaware. 173 But lawyers may be focused on other factors when
it comes to legal drafting that leads to larger investments of
time, money, and words in the drafting process. For example,
every lawyer may feel he or she has to leave their mark on the
agreement to justify their involvement (and billable hours), and
idiosyncratic changes may have little to do with efforts to
contract around defaults. 174 This potential interpretation may
169. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
170. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 53, at 818 (offering a theory that
contract design anticipates adversarial litigation); see also supra Part V.B
(using data to show that the length of M&A agreements is not meaningfully
affected by the selection of Delaware law).
171. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 53, at 817 (“Despite its theoretical
advances . . . the theory of incomplete contracts has yet to yield predictions
that are borne out by the realities of commercial practice.”).
172. See id. (discussing a gap between theory and practice).
173. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 5, at 391, 420 (presenting data
detailing Delaware’s dominance as the primary location of incorporation for
different types of firms); Irwin A. Kishner, Market Trends, Legal
Developments, and Their Effect on M&A Documentation, in MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS LAW 2013: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE
UPCOMING YEAR 5, 5 (2013) (discussing the outsized influence that Delaware
courts have because of the large number of M&A suits litigated in Delaware).
174. See generally Anderson & Manns, supra note 15 (discussing
idiosyncratic drafting in the M&A context).
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reveal more about the shortcomings of M&A lawyers and their
failures to economize on legal drafting than about the value of
Delaware law.
The textual focus of our study means we cannot discount
this possibility completely as we cannot directly observe the
drafting process and what factors shape lawyers’
decision-making in drafting. But given the sophistication of
M&A lawyers at elite firms and the concentration of the M&A
legal market, it seems very unlikely that lawyers are ignorant
of the significance of legal defaults or ignore them amidst the
drafting process. 175 To the extent that drafting pathologies exist,
it is unclear why they would be more or less likely to arise in
Delaware versus non-Delaware deals. But what is clear is that
Delaware M&A agreements were at least as long and generally
longer than agreements from other states even when we
accounted for a spectrum of control variables including the deal
structure, the quality of law firms, deal complexity, and the size
of the transaction. 176 While it is possible that Delaware
statutory and judicial defaults may have significant advantages
over the defaults of other jurisdictions, lawyers’ failure to place
greater reliance on Delaware law in legal drafting (compared to
other jurisdictions) suggest that they perceive that there is no
advantage to relying on Delaware defaults. 177
Our analysis of the content of the agreements further shows
only superficial differences between agreements relying on
Delaware law and courts compared to those relying on other
states’ law and courts. 178 In fact, the most predictive variable for
the final product of the agreement’s text is the precedent
agreement from which counsel copied the original draft. 179 This
175. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 53, at 816–18 (suggesting that
lawyers are highly aware of the front- and back-end costs of contract drafting).
176. See supra Part V.
177. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 53, at 818 (implying that lawyers will
increasingly rely on defaults if those defaults are advantageous); see also supra
Part V (using data to illustrate the relative length of M&A agreements relying
on Delaware defaults and the defaults of other jurisdictions).
178. See supra Table 9 (listing superficial language to remove from the
Random Forest predication).
179. See supra Table 5 (examining choice of law, forum, and incorporation
after controlling for precedent length).
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fact reinforces the potential interpretation that reliance on
statutory and judicial defaults does not play as significant a
factor in legal drafting as incomplete contract theory
suggests. 180 The strong influence of the precedent document
does reveal, however, the importance of the choice of the
precedent on the form and content of the final document. This
path-dependent process of textual evolution in turn informs
questions about why contracts are incomplete based on lawyers’
drafting practices. 181 This finding may call for a reassessment of
how broadly to construe the implications of incomplete contract
theory, and at minimum underscores the need for greater
empirical research to examine the potential and limits of this
law and economics paradigm and contractual drafting.
An important caveat in analyzing these interpretations of
the data is the need to address the possibility that agreements
governed by Delaware law are longer because the transactions
involved are more complex. 182 It is possible that transactions
selecting Delaware law disproportionately involve novel legal
issues or other forms of complexity, or simply employ counsel
more inclined to create prolix agreements. 183 In that case, the
word savings attributable to Delaware law might be reduced or
even negated by these selection effects. Although we have
attempted to control for the complexity of the transactions, it is
possible our controls failed to control completely for deal
complexity. At the same time, that possibility is significantly
reduced by several factors discussed in our responses to
potential objections in Part VI.B.2.
The centerpiece for our analysis is the construction of
models of the lengths of agreements that have the agreements’

180. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 53, at 818 (suggesting that in
anticipation of litigation, statutory and judicial defaults play an important
role).
181. See Robert Anderson IV, Path Dependence, Information, and
Contracting in Business Law and Economics, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 553, 558–62
(theorizing why the use of precedent documents leads to contract
incompleteness).
182. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
183. See Kishner, supra note 173, at 8 (discussing Delaware’s influence on
M&A transactions).

1258

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1197 (2020)

length in words serve as the dependent variable. 184 We
conducted regression analysis of the two key independent
variables (choice of law and the choice of forum for Delaware
versus non-Delaware) separately, as well as their connection to
the target’s state of incorporation. 185 We included a broad set of
control variables including cash-only mergers (to control for the
greater length of cash-only mergers), a date variable (to control
for the increase in length over time), logged-enterprise value (to
account for the potential impact of transaction size on deal
length), and controls for major deal elements (to control for
complexities that could potentially affect deal length). 186 We
also included dummy variables to analyze “special” industries
in the data set (banking firms and REITs) as well as to account
for whether the buyer’s and seller’s counsel were “Top 20” firms
to account for any potential impact of elite firms on legal
drafting. 187
This set of control variables is not comprehensive, as we
could expand on these models to account for a broader range of
deal dimensions that could affect the length of agreements as
we refine our analysis. 188 That is an objection that can be made
for virtually all regression analysis studies as there are always
more control variables that could be considered. 189 But the
control variables we use do offer statistically significant
evidence that the choice of Delaware law is correlated with
longer agreements, even when we account for the structure of
the deal, the date of the deal, and the size of the industry. 190 Our
finding that the choice of Delaware law is associated with at
least one thousand more words than agreements that opt for the
law of other states suggests that lawyers may place no more
confidence in Delaware defaults than those of other jurisdictions
184. See supra Part V.A. (detailing the analytical methods used to gather
data).
185. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 124–127 and accompanying text.
188. See supra Part V.A.
189. See MONTGOMERY, ET. AL, supra note 119, at 15–16 (discussing
residuals and their impact on linear regression model adequacy).
190. See supra Table 3 (incorporating control variables for deal structure,
complexity, and industry size).
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and therefore invest at least as much time and energy (and
generally more) in drafting terms for Delaware deals than their
non-Delaware counterpart agreements. 191
Our modeling of the agreement length by choice of forum
(without other Delaware controls) produced similar results to
the choice of Delaware law analysis, which we would expect
because the choice of forum and choice of law are correlated. 192
However, in models controlling for Delaware governing law, the
Delaware choice of forum results were not statistically
significant. 193 While all acquisition agreements in the data set
selected Delaware or another state to serve as the governing law
for the agreement, not every agreement chose an exclusive
forum for the resolution of disputes. This fact may lead to
selection bias in the results for Delaware choice of forum, which
is consistent with the effect for choice of forum disappearing
(and indeed reversing) as deal complexity variables are
controlled. 194 But the larger story is that Delaware choice of law
and choice of forum are generally correlated, and in the deals in
which they go together they are associated with significantly
longer agreements than in non-Delaware choice of law and
choice of forum agreements. 195 This fact suggests that lawyers
do not perceive any less of a need to invest time and energy in
drafting Delaware deals than they do in drafting other deals,
and in fact generally invest far more effort in drafting Delaware
deals.
Our finding in Table 3 that companies incorporated in
Delaware who opt for Delaware choice of law are associated with
shorter agreements than for non-Delaware companies who opt
for Delaware choice of law does suggest a potential caveat and
a future research direction for our results. This finding suggests
that some of the additional length may be attributable to
counsel for non-Delaware incorporated companies having to
tailor agreements to fit non-Delaware corporations into the
ambit of Delaware law. However, in an unreported regression
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Table 3.
See supra Table 3.
See supra Table 4.
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we analyzed only Delaware-incorporated companies opting for
Delaware choice of law or Delaware choice of forum, and we still
found that there is a positive (although not statistically
significant) increase in length for Delaware agreements
compared to agreements in which companies opt for
non-Delaware choice of law or forum. This finding suggests that
M&A lawyers may not be merely conforming agreements to fit
governing Delaware law, but instead may actually be drafting
more detailed agreements whose terms are opting out of
Delaware defaults.
It is possible that the length of agreements does not
completely capture the extent to which jurisdictional differences
drive agreement drafting. For this reason we applied a Random
Forest classifier approach to the data. 196 The Random Forest
approach was able to predict agreements that opted for
Delaware choice of law and non-Delaware choice of law. 197 But
the distinctions the approach identified were largely superficial
terms related to the nomenclature of Delaware compared to
other jurisdictions. 198 This point may help to explain the one
notable exception that runs counter to our finding of Delaware
agreements being systematically longer: why non-Delaware
incorporated companies who opted for Delaware choice of law in
M&A agreements had marginally longer agreements than their
Delaware incorporated counterparts who also opted for
Delaware choice of law. 199 There may simply be a certain level
of “Delaware overhead” verbiage necessary to translate between
jurisdictions. But this analysis did not identify differences in
substantive terms that would allow us to say with greater
certainty that the difference in length of agreements that opt for
Delaware choice of law or Delaware forum are longer because
parties are contracting out of Delaware defaults in favor of more
precise, substantive provisions. 200 The Random Forest analysis
therefore lends support to the idea that Delaware agreements
are not drafted materially differently from non-Delaware
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See supra Part V.B.
See supra Table 7.
See supra Table 8.
See supra Table 3.
See supra Table 10.
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agreements in their substantive content, a fact which
underscores the apparent absence of an advantage to relying on
Delaware law.
One limitation of the paper is that we cannot conclusively
point towards an explanation for what is shaping lawyers’
decisions throughout the contractual drafting process. That, in
part, reflects the limitation of engaging in reverse engineering
analysis based on observing the merger agreement outcomes.
We are neither using survey data to observe what lawyers think
they are doing when drafting the agreements, nor do we have
access to the detailed drafts that could showcase the give and
take of the negotiation and drafting process because of the limits
of public company disclosures (and the reluctance of law firms
to share work product from the various stages of the drafting
process with researchers).
But one plausible interpretation of the results in this paper
is that regardless of the perception lawyers have of what they
are doing in legal drafting, the strong pull of the precedent
document’s text dominates the deal-by-deal judgment about
client needs. 201 The results in Table 5 show that the strongest
predictor of the number of words in a document is the number
of words in its precedent document, a fact that shows a
tremendous path-dependency in transactional drafting. We
have extensively documented the persistence of vestigial terms
and left-over verbiage from precedent agreements in previous
work. 202 Our results therefore might stand for another
proposition, which is that the legal work product that
transactional lawyers create may be excessively influenced by
the happenstance of which precedent agreement was chosen as
the foundation for the drafting process or how the draft evolved,
rather than the needs of the specific transaction or the defaults
of the underlying choice of law or forum. Either way, our
findings suggest that no Delaware advantage in legal drafting
201. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 16, at 57 (theorizing that
substantive similarities in distinct merger agreements reveal inefficiencies in
the drafting process).
202. See generally id. (using computer textual analysis to identify
precedent documents in the merger agreement context); Anderson & Manns,
supra note 15 (examining the effect of inefficient drafting on boilerplate
language in merger agreements).

1262

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1197 (2020)

exists for M&A agreements based on Delaware choice of law or
forum. Instead, we found the opposite to be true empirically as
Delaware M&A agreements were generally longer than
agreements whose defaults rest on statutory and judicial
defaults from non-Delaware jurisdictions.
B.

Objections

The key finding from our analysis is that reliance on
Delaware law does not lead to parties economizing on deal
terms, contrary to the prediction we would derive from the
standard law and economic analysis of contracting. 203 In fact, in
most of the models, Delaware agreements were longer in a
statistically significant way. 204 This type of “equivalence”
finding is subject to a number of common objections, so we
address them at some length in this section. Although some of
these objections have merit, deeper analysis of the data refutes
each of them.
1.

The “Equivalence” Objection

First, some might argue that because the Delaware
variables were not significant in some of the models, the
analysis fails to show that Delaware law does not allow drafters
to economize on contractual terms. 205 There are two responses
to this objection. First, in all models where Delaware choice of
law was analyzed separately from the highly correlated
variables on forum choice and state of incorporation, the
coefficient was positive and significant. 206 Thus, for those
models we can reject the null hypothesis that Delaware choice
of law has no effect on agreement length in favor of the
alternative hypothesis that it is associated with increased
agreement length.
Second, even if one focuses on the models in which there is
equivalence between Delaware and non-Delaware agreements,
the model still tells us quite a bit about the effect of Delaware
203.
204.
205.
206.

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra notes 134–136 and accompanying text.
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law. In fact, the contrary argument is based on a common
misunderstanding of hypothesis testing. It is true that in those
models we cannot reject the hypothesis that Delaware has any
effect on lowering the word count, but we can reject the
hypothesis that Delaware has any substantial effect beyond a
certain size on agreement length with 95 percent confidence. 207
Even in the most unfavorable model for the “no effect”
hypothesis (Model 2 of Table 4), the confidence interval for “All
Delaware” deals’ effect on word count is -428.4 to 883.6. Thus,
we can reject the hypothesis that reliance on Delaware law can
substitute for more than 428.4 words, which is a quite narrow
margin in an agreement averaging over 36,000 words. 208 Even
in the least favorable model the confidence intervals are quite
compressed which suggests that Delaware law has no impact on
legal drafting or is still correlated with a longer length compared
to agreements grounded in other jurisdictions. 209
2.

The “Confounding Variables” Objection

The second objection centers on the concern that our results
may be influenced by confounding variables. 210 It is possible
that transactions choosing Delaware law may tend to have
higher complexity than transactions grounded in other states’
laws, and that our independent variables do not adequately
control for that extra complexity. If that premise is true, we may
have incompletely controlled for transaction complexity. It is
possible that the increased complexity of Delaware transactions
is offsetting the savings in word count allowed by reliance on
Delaware statutory and judicial defaults.

207. See supra Part V.A.
208. See supra Table 4.
209. See, e.g., William C. Blackwelder, Proving the Null Result in Clinical
Trials, 3 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 345, 348–50 (1982) (discussing the
significance of null results in bioequivalence testing). Although this type of
analysis is less common in the social sciences “p-value” world, such analyses
are quite common in the scientific literature called “equivalence testing.” Id.
This approach is especially common in medical research in bioequivalence
testing, in which null results with narrow confidence intervals are used to
establish the equivalence of two pharmaceutical preparations. Id.
210. See MONTGOMERY, ET AL., supra note 119, at 15–17.
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There are several strong counterarguments to this claim.
First, the fact that choice of forum loses significance as control
variables are added in Table 3 (and indeed switches sign), while
the same does not happen for choice of law is strong support that
the choice of law coefficient does not result from confounding
(although the choice of forum may). Also, the fact that the “Top
20” variable for the law firms involved is small in magnitude
and not significant is telling. 211 The “Top 20” law firms are
overwhelmingly used in more complex transactions, and yet
they do not predict greater agreement length when the control
variables are used. 212 Indeed, merely removing the logged
transaction value and the “Delaware law” variables from the
controls made both the “Top 20” seller firm and the “Top 20”
buyer firm statistically significant predictors of longer
agreements. 213 These relationships were reversed by the
inclusion of control variables, suggesting we have successfully
controlled for the role of “deal complexity” in the process. 214
Finally, the control for precedent length should incorporate any
deal complexity concerns, as the precedent is, at least in theory,
chosen for its similarity to the deal at hand (including most
complexities). 215
Indeed, it is possible that confounding variables work the
other way. There are some controls we used that have the
potential to artificially reduce the effect of the choice of
Delaware law or forum on increasing the length of agreements.
In particular, the most common category of non-Delaware
companies are banks and bank holding companies. 216 Banking
companies have lower rates of Delaware incorporation than do
other companies (due to regulatory reasons since state banks
are incorporated in the state that they operate and are regulated

211. See supra Table 3.
212. See supra Table 3.
213. See supra Table 3.
214. See supra Table 3.
215. See supra Table 5 (controlling for length of precedent document).
216. See FED. RES., INSURED U.S.-CHARTERED COMMERCIAL BANKS THAT
HAVE CONSOLIDATED ASSETS OF $300 OR MORE (2020), https://perma.cc/5NSQU7KW (PDF) (demonstrating through bank location data the small number of
banks incorporated in Delaware).
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in). 217 However, they also have shorter agreements because of
drafting practices peculiar to the industry and their reliance on
stringent regulatory frameworks that are difficult to contract
around. 218 Thus, it is possible that our controls actually suggest
even stronger evidence that either reliance on Delaware does
not enable lawyers to reduce contract detail and length or that
lawyers are not recognizing and taking advantage of the
potential value of these statutory and judicial defaults when
engaged in legal drafting. Either of these potential conclusions
underscore the need for greater scrutiny in future research of
both the ostensible value-added of Delaware law and the
potential pathologies taking place in the legal drafting process.
3.

The “All the Important Terms Are Included in Every Deal”
Objection

A third objection one might make is that the cost of
including additional terms is relatively small compared to the
magnitude of M&A deals, which therefore makes it easier for
lawyers to justify including all the important terms in every
deal. In other words, whether the governing law has desirable
default rules or not, parties include all the important terms in
every deal, simply duplicating the desirable default rules in
some transactions and overriding undesirable default rules in
other transactions. Thus, the fact that we find that parties do
not economize on terms in deals based on Delaware choice of law
and forum may potentially not say as much about the
significance of Delaware’s statutory and judicial defaults as
about inefficiencies in the drafting process. 219
This objection has three significant problems. First, the cost
of additional drafting effort is not solely the cost of additional
217. See Nicholas Economides et al., The Political Economy of Branching
Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition
Among Small and Large Banks, 39 J.L. & ECON. 667, 668–69 (1996) (noting
that banking regulations place geographical limits on bank branching).
218. See id. (discussing how commercial banks are subject to a high degree
of regulation in “virtually all countries”).
219. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 16, at 64–65 (discussing the use
of precedent documents in transaction drafting).
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attorney time, which may well be low compared to the
magnitude of the transaction. 220 The larger cost is the delay in
the drafting process of including additional terms, which grows
with the magnitude of the transaction. Spelling out additional
terms is costly even if the actual cost of lawyers’ time is low in
an individual deal because of the time-compressed nature of the
merger agreement drafting process. 221
The second problem is that if all the important terms are
included in every deal (because of the insignificance of costs
relative to the magnitude of the deal), why does the length of
the agreement vary strongly with the value of the consideration
being paid? In the full model of Table 3 the coefficient on the log
of deal size is 967. 222 This implies, for example, that a $20 billion
acquisition will have 5,123 additional words compared to a $100
million acquisition. 223 Considering that the average number of
words of the agreements in the database is about 36,309, that is
approximately 14 percent more words based on transaction size.
The relationship of transaction size to word count suggests that
cost is constraining the expression of at least some of the
important terms in smaller transactions. Therefore, at
minimum we would expect to see that lawyers in smaller
transactions would be seeking to economize on drafting and
leveraging the value of statutory and judicial defaults (to the
extent to which the defaults truly add value and lawyers are
able and willing to recognize this value).
Third, important sections of merger agreements do contain
what is likely suboptimal detail, and this produces a significant
(and increasing) number of litigated cases (as well as untold
interpretive disputes that are settled privately). 224 This fact
220. See id. at 90 (“[E]ven though the costs of M&A lawyers appear high,
legal bills still constitute only a small fraction of the cost of M&A
transactions.”).
221. See Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese,” 77
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 63 (2001) (explaining the motivation to use precedent
documents).
222. See supra Part V.
223. This is calculated by 967*log(10,000,000,000)-967*log(100,000,000).
224. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon,
Explaining the Increase in M&A Litigation, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 559–60 (2015)
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suggests that parties are, in fact, constrained by costs in spelling
out the optimal resolution of all contingencies in the agreement
because of the potential to avoid litigation and the resulting
uncertainties.
VII. Conclusion
We have shown that M&A agreements that opt for
Delaware choice of law or forum are no shorter than agreements
based on other jurisdictions’ choice of law or forum even when
we control for a spectrum of variables, such as the deal
structure, time, size of the transaction, and major deal
elements. Delaware-governed agreements generally appear to
be longer in statistically significant ways, even with other
factors fully controlled. These findings support the hypothesis
that corporate lawyers do not rely on the perceived superiority
of Delaware law and courts, at least in terms of how they design
contracts. 225 Lawyers may simply give lip service to the
reputation of Delaware law and its judiciary, but when drafting
M&A agreements pay no more attention (and possibly less) to
the statutory and judicial defaults than they would to the
defaults of any other jurisdiction. This conclusion shows that
Delaware statutory and judicial defaults do not appear to
matter in a context where the Delaware difference in business
law and adjudication should be clear. Ultimately, this finding
calls into question the durability of Delaware’s outsized
reputation in corporate law. Lawyers’ practices in drafting
speak to the degree of their confidence in Delaware and the need
for Delaware’s legislature and judiciary to enhance the
comprehensiveness and precision of Delaware corporate law
defaults.

(discussing the increase in number and scale of M&A litigation involving
public company mergers, noting that by 2015 over 97.5 percent of public
company mergers involving deals over $100 million faced litigation).
225. See, e.g., Carney, Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 134–42
(pointing to survey data to argue that lawyers’ confidence in and reliance on
Delaware corporate law is based both on Delaware’s reputation and lawyers’
ignorance of the alternative corporate law frameworks offered by other states).

